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'l'he Proble!ft. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of this thesis is why the United Labor 
Policy Ooumdttee, the first unification of organized labor 
in fifteen years, did not last more than eight months. The 
hypotheses of the paper will attempt to prove that the 
reason for this break up was the one given by the American 
~ederation of Labor. The AFL stated that the work of this 
Committee was finished by August, 1951. All the ends for 
which the Committee had been formed were achieved. There 
was no further need for united action at this time. 
The Formation of the United Labor Policy Coumdttee. 
Organized Labor in December, 1950 had finally 
realized the danger which it was facing in its struggle to 
maintain its position of power in the political and econamio 
life of the nation. In~: f.o~ifr.g the United Labor Policy Com-
mittee four of the leading Labor Organizations, claiming 
1 
a membership of 15,000,000 workers, made known to the rest 
of the nation that they were ready to fight for the survival 
of Organized Labor •. 
The United Labor Policy Co~ttee was formed to 
secure adequate representation for Labor in the newly-formed 
-1-
I 
II 
; 
I 
!j' 
'I 
I 
' I 
n.efense agencies. The leading men from all four organiza-
2 
tiona met for their first meeting in December, 1951. 
3 
At this first meeting fourteen of the top Labor 
Leaders were present to state their position as to the best 
manner in which to make the Federal Government realize that 
Labor, by membership and tradition, had the right to repre-
sentation in the Office of Defense Mobilization. In this 
crisis only Jolm L. Lewis of the United !line Workers refused 
the invitation to attend the conference, or have anything 
4 
to do with the unification which was proposed. 
At the meeting it was decided by a majority of the 
leaders present that Labor unity must at all coats be main-
tained. It was evident by this agreement that the years of 
struggling with the War Labor Board during the Second World 
War, and with the later labor losses during the Post-War 
Period especially with the regulations of union practices 
5 
through the Taft•Hartley Act in 1947, d~~utth the approaching 
new and stricter controls possible due to the passage of the 
Defense Production Act in 1950~ tt was ~Je&e~ to the Labor 
,, 
I 
Organizations that unification was the only hope of salvation. 
1 
Only by this measure could Labor hope to regain any of the 11 
ground which it had lost in its fight to maintain a national 
governmental program which would be essentially favorable 
to the interests of organized Labor. 
It was agreed by the representatives of the American 
'I 
.
1 
Federation of ~abor, the Congress of Industrial Organisation, 
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the International Association of Machinists, and the Railroad 
6 II 
Brotherhoods that the situation they were now facing was 
serious enough to make them forget past differences of opin-
ion. Even the AFL was willing in this instance to unify on 
"' the CIO terms of Functional Unity. 
This program of unity wae to last, upon the agree-
ment made at the conference, only until the groups represent-
ed felt certain that the crisis they foresaw had been averted 
by their program. At this time any of the group, if it so 
desired, could end its participation in the activities of 
8 
the newly formed Committee. This provision, made by the 
AFL ~epresentativea, was readily accepted by the 0!0 leaders 
who evidently felt that in the face of past enmity, a great 
victory bad been won by their organization to have gained 
Functional unity on any terms. 
Issues to be Solved by Unitz. 
At their December Conference, the representatives 
of Labor outlined their program for political action. In 
the first place, all transactions of Labor would be handled 
through the United Labor Policy Committee which would re-
qpire a unanimous vote of the Committee before any steps 
9 
could be taken. This unanimity was required so that all 
the Labor Organizations would be assured that any action 
which was taken by the Committee would not work against 
the minority members. 
3 
It was also an attempt on the part of the two larger 
organizations to prevent a majority vote from being cast for 
any program which they did not desire to have initiated by 
the Committee. In the third place, the requirement of 
unanimity assured that all the Committee's actions would be 
firmly supported by the members of the participating organ-
izations. In this way it would be possible to maintain the 
complete unity of the laboring groups which was an absolute 
necessity, if their program of action on the Wage, Price, 
and Manpower policies of the government was to be effective. 
After solving the problem of how unit.J was to be 
maintained, the United Labor Policy Committee which had to 
face the problem of how to obtain representation for Labor 
.in the Defense Agencies. Labor, without a doubt, felt they 
had been discriminated against by the Defense Progrsm when 
Charles E. Wilson, formerly President of the General Electric 
Company, was appointed by President Truman to head the Office , 
10 
of Defense Mobilization. 
President Truman, in appointing Wilson to administer 
this new agency, had stipulated that Wilson was to have full 
and complete control of the Defense Program. However, the 
President had made Wilson head of the Agency upon the condi-
tion that he give one of the top advisory posts to a repre-
11 
sentative of the laboring group. 
4 
Wilson consented to this requirement made b7 the ~I 
'I President when he took the post of Defense Mobilizer in the 
late fall of 1950. It was soon evident that he had no in-
tention of keeping his agreement. Although he did offer one 
of the top poets to the labor leaders, he did eo with the 
proviso that whoever was given the job would have to give 
12 
up all hie other activities. 
This provisi on would mean that any labor leader 
who accepted the pos~ would be required to give up 8n7 union 
office he might hold. It might possibly mean that he would 
have to give up his union membership. This requirement then 
was one which Wilson, through his association with union 
activities as a member of the War Production Board in World 
War II and as President of General Electric, must have known 
13 
that no union leader would accept. 
Labor Leaders believed that to accept this post on 
Wilson's terms would mean that any one of them who took the 
job would have to sacrifice a whole lifetime's work for a 
position which would neither be permanent nor to his future 
advantage as a leader of labor activity. 
Wilson, in making this condition for the office, 
was assured that no Labor Leader would accept the advisory 
defense poet. He had by this one action made clear his posi-
tion pertaining to organized labor. He, in a sense, defied 
both President Truman and the Labor Organizations, for he 
had been given the post on the condition that one of the top 
5 
-r jobs would be giTen to a Labor Leader. Yet it oould not be 
j said that he did not offer the position to labor. He gave 
14 
his two top advisory positions to General Lucius Cla7 and 
. 15 
Sidney Weinburg • onl7 after Labor had refused to take one 
of the posts on the conditions made. 
United Labor's Problema. 
'rhe actions which ehe.rl s E. Wilson took upon his 
appointment as head of the Office of Defense Mobilization wer~ 
considered by the ULPO to be a declaration of war against 
organized labor. The committee felt that positive action 
had to be taken b7 the labor organizations if further detri-
mental action by the Office of Defense Mobilization were to 
be avoided. This opportunity for labor action came in De-
cember, 1950. President Truman announced that due to an 
increasing need for manpower in essential industries, a new 
program of manpower controls would go into effect at the 
16 
beginning of the Wew Year. 
The United Labor Conference was called in December 
in order to take action on this issue as well as that of 
representation. At the conference it was also decided that 
the labor organizations should work for a favorable price 
and wage control program and a New Defense Production Act I 
in June, 1951. 11 
At the conference the labor leaders stated the 
basic labor fear that if Wilson were to be given control of 
manpower, he might begin a program to draft labor. This 
6 
I 
~ 
I 
draft of manpower for shortage areas of the nation had been 
prepared during World War II, but the shortage had never 
become great enough actually. to demand a draft of labor to 
1'1 
save the nation. 
However, by December, 1950, the shortage of labor 
was much greater than it had been in World war II. (See 
Chapter V). The administration and the administrative pol-
icies had also changed from what they had been in Wor14 War 
II. In December, 1960 there was no labor representative 
in the office of Defense Mo~ilisatia.n acting as Co•Chairman 
of the program as had been the case in World War II when 
Sidney Hillman (CIO) had been co-chairman o'f the Defense 
18 
Program • In fact, President Truman had given full author-
1 ty to one man whereas in the .previous instance the author-
1 ty was split between two men, William Knudsen acting for 
management and Hillman for labor. 
Thus, although labor lost some of its power in 
the earlier situation, it was still in a better bargaining 
position than it was to be during the first part of the 
Korean Crisis. Labor in the Second world War was still free 
19 ' 
from the Taft•Hartley Act's restrictions which c~e in 194'1 , , 
and more important during World War II. Labor had represen-
tation on all the Defense Agencies which it was not given 
during the first part of the Korean Crisis. 
In December of 1950, however, the labor organiza-
tions had finally realized that if they did not act quickly, 
the whole defense program would be placed entirely in the 
hands of the management interest groups in the nation. 
Charles E. Wilson had alreaay indicated by his action in 
not appointing a Labor leader .as one of his chief advisers 
that he did not intend to let labor have much voice ·in the 
planning of the program. 
The Labor groups feared that if Wilson were to 
continue with his present attitude tQWard their organizations, 
then Labor would be required to give up much of the freedom 
of action which they had had up to the time of the Korean 
Crisis. The Labor leaders did not want controls placed on 
wages and manpower until they were sure that Labor would have 
representation in the office which controlled these policies 
and would be guaranteed freedom of action for union aotivi ty. 
It was evident to the men who represented Labor 
at the ULPO conference that this freedom might be clearl7 
restricted, if Wilson were to be given the complete control 
of the manpower forces of the nation. He had already indi-
cated that he believed that a labor draft was the only solu-
20 
tion to the manpower shortage. 
The United Labor Policy Committee tbns felt itself 
justified in its fear of Wilson's power in the Manpower 
sphere. Wilson up to this time had been he~dless of all 
the Labor suggestions for the initiation of a sound program 
8 
of Defense Mobilizatian. He had not even been willing to 
appoint a Labor Advisor to his personal staff without first 
making a condition for acceptance which he knew no labor 
21 
leader would accept. 
These were the factors which finall~ prevailed 
upon the Labor Organisations to forget past differences 
and unite to save their positions in the economic life of 
the nation. It was a situation which was exceedinglY" danger- 1 
o'Q.s to union seouri t~, which had been even before the ap-
pointment of Wilson to the Office of Defense Mobilization, 
at ita lowest ebb since before the New Deal. 
I 
I 
1 
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CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED LABOR POLICY OODITHE 
UNITES THE AFL AND OIO FOR FIRST TIME 
IN F1FTEEN YEARS 
At first appearances it is difficult to comprehend 
the reasons why the AFL and CIO should so suddenly unite 
after such a great number of years of obvious fear and hatre! 
for each other. However, on closer observation of the situa-
tion, it is apparent that the problems which faced these two 
major Labor Organizations during the Korean War Crisis were 
of such magnitude that only "lllli ty could solve them. It was 
only by a policy of unity that the Al!'L and CIO could combat 
the apparent anti-labor sentiment which had been building up 
in the nation since the beginning of World War II·. 
However, beoauae of the emergency ai tuaticm oc-
casioned by World war II, Labor was required to give up many 
of the gains it had made. The Federal Government after De-
cember 7, 1941 was pitched into an all-out war with a tremen-
dous need for manpower not only for the military services, 
but also for the industries at hame. Organized Labor pledged 
1 
itself immediately to a no-strike agreement. Both AFL and 
, OIO leaders, William Green and Philip Jlurray promised the 
2 
complete support of their organizations to the Defense efforts. 
-12-
Yet neither organization made any serious effort to combine 
formally their forces to present a united Labor front to 
the government. 
Needless to say the major reason for this lack 
of action on the part of the Labor Organizations in tbis 
instance was the fact that the Roosevelt administration at 
the beginning of the war was essentially favorable to Labor's 
interests. Therefore, each of the Labor Organizations re- ,· 
ceived adequate representation on all the newly-created 
Defense Agencies. Tbns the War Labor Board, the later 
Office of War Mobilization, the War Manpower Commission, 
and the Office of Price Administration were all made tri-
partite boards consisting of members representing Labor, 
3 
Public, and Management interests. 
Labor not only had representation on all these 
Agencies, but the second in command of the Defense Program 
was none other than the CIO's Sidney Hillman who was appoint-
ed co-Chairman of Industrial Mobilization along with William 
4 
Knudsen by President Roosevelt. 
The situation in World War II then was evidently 
aa favorable a one at the beginning as could be attained by 
the Laboring groups, considering the split in their ranks, 
and the pressures on the administration from other such 
important groups as Agriculture and Management. 
However,the Labor Organizations did not manage to 
retain their hold on these advantages, nor to keep their 
13 
high favor in the eyes of the President and Congress during 
the War Years. ~e first real conflict between the Labor 
interests and the Defense Administration arose in 1942 when 
5 
the Little Steel Strike was called. The problem at this 
time was the now ancieDt revolt over Wage Stabilization and 
6 
its relation to Price Controls. After a hearing by the 
War Labor Board it was finally decided that wages should be 
allowed an increase of fifteen per cent over the base period J 
of Janu817, 1941.' This decision waa accepted by the Little 11 
Steel Workers who then returned to their jobs. 
However, after this time the 'Government Regulations 
steadily became more strict as the years of war activit7 
continued. More control was asked by President Roosevelt in 
1943 as he ordered the War Labor Board to continue to enforce 
8 
the Little Steel Formula and to keep workers on their jobs 
in the essential industries. 
It was evident as the years passed that Labor was 
sacrificing many of the principles for which the Unions had 
worked so strenuously to gain for their members. In return 
I 
I 
for their saerifiees such as the na-strike pledge, regn.lationsl 
on wages and labor mobilit7, Labor did of course obtain cer-
tain guarantees of their position. Pay had to be according 
to the standards set by govenunent. There could be no arbi-
traey firing or dismissal from a job. The War Manpower Com-
mission and the National Labor Relations Board both were 
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empowered to act on cases where rules pertaining to Labor 1 
were violated. Thus management as well as labor also was 
subjected to control. 
However, organized labor felt that it was more 
strictly regulated than the business group. The labor 
leaders felt that the wage regulation especially under the 
Little Steel Formula did not allow the laboring man to make 
as large a profit percentage wise as did the businessman 
despite the high taxes which the administration imposed in 
order to keep wages and business profits on an even balance. 
On the whole, however, the record of organized 
labor during the War years was exceedingly good. The per-
centage of strikes in industry was much lower than it had 
been in any year in the 1930's. Only thirty"one oases of 
labor disputes called for government intervention during 
three years of War. Seventeen of these were caused by 
Labor's refusal to accept the Government's program of media-
9 
tion, while fourteen of the refusals were made by management. 
Labor therefore bad nearly as good a record as Management 
in these disputes. 
When strikes were called, however, it was un-
fortunate for Labor's interests, as they always occurred 
in the most essential and noted industries. Thus the Public 
and Congress throughout the war years did not observe the 
good record which Labor had made. Instead, attention was 
centered on the major disputes with Labor during some of 
==-=- =- -lf==--=-
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1 the darkest da7s of War history. 
Organized Labor in its struggle to gain higher 
wages, after the Cost-of•Living index according to the 
BUreau of Labor statistics had risen in 1944 to over thirty-
;O 
seven per cent, began a campaign to have the fifteen per cent 
allowance allowed by the Little Steel Formula revoked. Labor \ 
leaders believed they did have a fairly substantial case for \ 
their action. The u.s. Bureau of Labor Sta.tistics reported 
by the end of 1943, the Cost-of-Living had risen to 23.4 
11 
per cent. Yet the outbreak of strikes in 1943 in such 
12 
essential industries a:sa. coal brought partial ruin to the 
Labor Organizations. ~e most dramatic of the strikes to 
ooour at this time was that of the United Mine Workers who 
for six weeks in the summer of that year held up coal pro-
13 
duction with a demand for $2.20 per day increase in pay. 
This demand by President John L. Lewis of the 
UMW led directly to the passage of the Smith-Connelly Act 
whioh provided for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes 
by the War Labor Board, a thirty-day eooling off period 
before the strike could be called, and for government seizure 
of the industry if the dispute were not settled. This act 
also provided a much more significant control of the Labor 
Organizations in the provision against union contributions 
14 
to political funds. 
Tbus, although the strike record was essentially 
better than that of any of the other Allied nations during 
the same time, the strikes which did occur were of such 
magnitude that they undoubtedly aroused some anti-labor 
sentiment in the American people who, after observing the 
coal and steel strikes of the war years, apparently came 
to the conclusion that Labor was willing to sell out the 
natiGD for its own selfish ends. 
!here was evidence of this same sentiment on 
the part of the People that sent a Republican majority to 
Congress in the election of 1946. This Congress, newly 
elected and with the fUll support of the greater part of 
1'1 17 
I 
I 
I 
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a nation, which had watched the Little Steel Strike in I 
1942, the Coal Strike in 1943, and the Railroad and Steel / 
Strikes of 1945 and 1946, felt completely. justified in \ 
passing the Taft•Bartley Act of 1947. Labor here lost 
most of the advantages which it had gained during the New 
Deal years. This Act of 1947 prevented the Closed Shop, 
provided for thirty-day cooling off periods for strikes, 
and denied the right of a union to use force in order to 
15 
make a worker join the union. 
Labor Unity from 1935-1950. 
It seems strange that in the face of the condi-
tions with which Labor was confronted during these War and 
Post-War years that unity between the Al'L and OIO had not 
been achieved. Of course, the period after the break I IL-
l 
I 
I 
lj 
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between the two organizations was one which was essentially 
favorable to all Organized Labor. There was no thought of 
unity on the part of the OlO in 193'7 , when the AFL, first 
beginning to fear the new group, asked John L. Lewis if he 
did not think it was time to bring his recalcitrant group 
16 
back into the older organization. 
However, Lewis by this time was feeling the power 
of his convictiGns_, and was in no mood to return to the fold 
on the old terms of Craft Unionism and organic 'IJni ty. The 
new CIO with the support of the Democratic Administration 
and its leader, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was in no burry to 
give up the advantages and power which it had attained due 
to its break with the AFL. 
By 1938 the Congress of Industrial Organization 
was a complete and B!tD$rate Labor Organization claiming a 
1'7 
membership of over ,,000,000 workers. However, by this 
time President Roosevelt, although he favored what he con-
II 
sidered the more progressive ideas of the CIO, was beginning Ji 
to worry over the lack of unity and the hatred that was II 
building up between the two Labor Organizations. In 1939, 
both Organizations finally consented to attend a unity con-
ference to be held at the Wh1 te House. However, such a 
grudge had been built up between the two, there was little 
18 
possibility of any unity being achieved at that time. 
Nevertheless, Labor still en~oyed the full support of 
President Roosevelt, despite the fact that this unity 
II 
__ \L 19 
conference failed to bring the two major organizations any 
closer to a solution of their difficulties. 
To be sure, the President tended to favor the 
OIO more than the AFL, for the former Organization gave him 
their full support in the 1936 election, and were more or 
less pledged to the Democratic Party, whereas the !FL still 
included a great number of die-hard Republicans, like "Bill" 
19 
Hutchinson of the Carpenter's Union. 
Although the 1938 conference ended with unity 
still to be achieved, President Roosevelt did not consider 
unification to be a lost cause. He evidently foresaw the 
coming Labor troubles when he again called upon the OIO 
and the AlL to forget their past differences and solve their 
problems by unity in 1940. However, this appeal from the 
President went unheeded, as the Labor Organizations ap-
proached their best years in Organized Labor histor.y through 
1940•41. 
However, three years later in 1942 with Government 
II 
I 
\I 
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il 
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I 
controls becoming increasingly strict due to the War, neither , 
I the AFL nor the OIO was ready to consider unity on the terms 1 
proposed by John L. Lewis, now president only of the uww. 
Lewis had lost hie office as President of the OIO in order 
to keep his oath to the nation that he would tuit that 
office if he could not swing Labor support away frmn Pres-
ident Roosevelt in the 1940 election. When Roosevelt was 
re-elected, despite Lewis' plea to Labor, he kept his 
I' 
,, 
1: 
]! 
promise. And in a dramatic move left his office of President 
20 
of the CIO. 
In 1942 then Lewis proposed that the AFL, CIO, 
and UMI give up their identities and form a completely new 
Labor organization. This move would have meant a full ac-
21 
oeptance of the principle of Organic Unity thus following 
the type of unification so often recommended by the AFL. 
Yet neither the A!L nor the CIO would seriously 
consider the proposal which would set up the new and stronger 
Labor Organization. This refo.sal came in spite of the fact 
that by the end of 1942, all Labor groups were beginning to 
feel more restricted by the government actions which were 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. There are m&n7 
reasons why this proposal would not be accepted by the Labor 
Organizations. In the first place, the source of the pro-
, posal was not one to which these two organizations were favor-
able. Secondly, although the War si tuati em was not exactly 
favorable to organized Labor, at this time it was still not 
bad enough to make the two organizations forget their past 
differences. 
After all the membership in both Organizations 
had reached its highest peak in Organized Labor History. 
By the end of 1945 membership in the two Labor organizations 
22 
had reached over 14,000,000. The Democratic Administration 
was still favoring the Labor groups to some extent. In 1942, 
I when Lewis made his proposal, both the CIO and the AFL were 
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at the peak of their power. E'ei ther was willing to give up 
this power to any other organization new or old. 
The Jurisdictional Disputes. 
The original break between the .Al!'L and the CIO 
came with the disagreement between the two groups over the 
problem of allowing industrial unionism in the Al!'L. This 
problem however did not long remain the center of the 
dispute, nor the sole bar to unity between the two organiza-
23 
tiona. In fact, by 1938 the problem of Industrial Unions 
bad been solved for all time along the lines first advocated 
by the CIO. Some of the An unions realized that in the 
modern age, with the assembly line teclmiques being used in 
such an increasing number of industries, that industrial 
unionism would be the only way to orga.ni ze many of the 
workers. In many industries it was now impossible to dis-
tinguish one craft from another. In order to meet this 
problem some of the AFL groups, notably the Carpenter's 
24 
Union, became semi-industrial. Another and perhaps more 
significant reason for the AFL's sudden realization of the 
need for Industrial Unionism came with the jurisdictional 
disputes which occurred not only with CIO groupe, but within 
25 
the An itself. 
By 1940 it was evident that these jurisdictional 
disputes both from within and between the two organizations, 
were without a doubt the main barriers to any possible unity 
c=---==--=~~~- ~ ~ 
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between the two larger organizations. The tremendous gains 
made in membership by the OIO after it became independent 
of the AFL, along with the support which President Roosevelt 
gave the newly created organization, made the AFL fear that 
their organization was facing ultimate ruin. Tbus the 
leaders of the Al!'L began to accuse the CIO of stealing away 
their membership. The OIO,on the other hand, was quiok to 
26 
hurl back the same cbarges at the AFL. When the problem 
would come up before the National Labor Relatione Board, 
the usual result, after the Bargaining Agent had been de-
termined, was a horde of accusations from the Organization 
which had lost the decision claiming it lost because the 
2'1 
Board favored the other group. 
During the War years this problem became so acute 
th&t when the OIO union struck at the Montgomery Ward Mail 
Order House in Chicago in the Spring of 1944, the AFL shippers1 
for that same compsny stayed on the job claiming that the 
company was correct in not granting the raise asked by the 
CIO. The APL even went eo far as to claim that the National 
G-overnment was making a mistake in not deciding the dispute 
I 
I 
Regnlations any advantages given to the OIO workers wou1d ~~ 
also have benefited all other workers in the plant inoluding 11 
jl 
in favor of the company. This support was given to the 
company by the AFL despite the fact that under the Wartime 
those in the An Union. 
II 
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This Warfare over Jurisdiction and the envy which 
it caused between the two Organizations was also well illus-
trated in the dispute between the two over the appointment 
of Sidney Hillman of the OIO as Co-Chairman of Defense Pro-
duction. Th~ time the .AFL protested the appointment of the 
CIO leader~ d.espi te the fact t .hat there was no statutory 
provision, nor even a precedent which required the President 
28 
to appoint any Labor Leader to sueh a high position. Never-
theless, the AFL again accused the President of favoring 
the OIO. Of course in this case there was more than an 
element of truth in the statement, as the President using 
his political prerogative, gave his patronage to the Organ-
ization which gave him outright support in his political 
campaigns. Yet the AFL was not satisfied by the appointment 
of a Labor man. To be completely placated the man had to 
be AFL. Otherwise it seems, he could not actually be re-
presenting the best interests of Labor. 
This was the type of situation which prevailed 
whenever any unity was proposed during the War years. The 
AFL demanded Organic Unit7 in order to retrieve its old 
power. The leaders felt that if the OIC groups were to 
come back into the older Organization, then the leaders of 
the AFL could maintain their positions of leadership on the 
grounds that their's was the older organiza.tion,and the OIO 
would be left in the position of the prodigal returning to 
the fold. 
~==----==c=== 
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had gained a great deal of power in its own right. 
by 1944, with the help of the New Deal Administration, 
29 
grown until it claimed over 6,000,000 members. Its unions 
had captured the most influential industries in the country, 
30 
notably those of Steel, Automobiles, and Electricity. Thus 
the power of the CIO to control much of the nation's economy 
was without a doubt second only to those in actual control 
of these industries. 
The OIO Leaders had no intention of losing their 
power and prestige by returning to the AFL on the terms of 
Organic Unit,r. The CIO did not intend to sacrifice their 
unions, and their leaders to the Al'L concepts. Thus the 
ClO and A!'L continued tbrough the years of strife. The 
Jurisdictional raids on each other continued, and as they 
did so the name calling grew worse and more venomous, and 
the split between them apparently became too wide ever to 
be cemented together again. 
However, the CIO, realizing the danger of a split 
in Labor's ranks, especially on political issues, suggested 
a new form of unity. This Functional Unity as they termed 
it would unite the two great Labor groups by a representa-
tive council for the purpose of political action, and the 
settlement of major disputes, such as those which occurred 
over the jurisdictional problems. The CIO suggested tbis 
solution time and again as the Federal Restrictions became 
---==- --= -=== -- --- === =o---=========-====== -- ====-==----===:::: 
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stronger. 
The AFL refused to consider the OIO solution. 
The strain of the jurisdictional raids had caused too much 
hatred between these two organizations to be erased even by 
wartime control. The .AFL still felt that the fault was 
entirely w1 th the CIO which had originally caused the split. 
In the second place, the AFL was still smarting under the 
effects of loss of membershi·p due to the CIO raids. Lastly, 
the AFL resented what they believed to be President Roose-
velt's favoritism of the CIO. Thus the CIO and the .AFL 
reached a stalemate over the problem of unity. Each organ-
ization repeatedly stated the need for labor unity. Yet 
both refused to accept the other's proposals for achieving 
this unity. 
rhe main reason for this obstinacy on the part of 
both was that throughout the war years and even into the 
post-war years there had not been a single crisis which was 
great enough to force them to unify. 'l!hey did not realize 
that with the Wartime restrictions and the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, they had lost a great deal of political 
prestige. Other pressure groups such as Management and 
the Farm Bloc were proving to be too strong a political 
force in the natia.n. If Labor were again to be an effective 
political pressure group, it would have to unite. 
However, at the end of World war II, with Govern-
ment removal of the restrictions on wages, prices, and 
26 
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II 
msnp~er, there seemed to be even less need for Labor unity. 
Yet within a year after the War,Unio:nism was to enter some 
ot its darkest days since before the advent of the New Deal. 
32 
In 1946 the Smith-Connelly Act was still in force. It 
was also in 1946 that the People of the United States de-
cided they would do some political housecleaning; thus they 
sent a new Congress with a substantial Republican majority 
to the Capitol. This move by the electorate was partially 
the normal change of attitude usually occasioned by the 
ending of a war. It occurred in the United States after 
the first World War when the Democrats were put out of 
office in the 1920's, and it happened in Great Britain in 
1945 when the Labouritea defeated the Conservatives. 
However, in the United States in 1946, it was 
also a reflection on the activities of Labor during the 
War and Post~ar years. This c·onclusion was immediately 
evident when the 80th Congress upon reaching Washington in 
1947 drafted the Taft•Hartley Act, which passed over Presi-
dent Truman's veto with apparently the full support of 
33 
the non-laboring class public of the United States. 
Despite this overwhelming blow to the cause of 
Organized Labor, the CIO and the AFL still could not see 
their way to overcoming their own quarrels and differences. 
To unite organically meant that the CIO would lose a great 
deal of the power which it still possessed. To unite 
Functionally might prove so successful that there would 
26 
never be any hope for the achievement of organic Unity, for 
which the APL had campaigned for such a number of year s. 
Functional Unity, 1950: The United Labor Policy Committee. 
Although none of the conditions or regulations 
imposed by the Federal Government during the War and Post-
War years served to unite the Labor Groups, it was evident 
by 1950 that those regulations were beginning to have a 
marked effect on the thinking of both the AFL and the oro. 
For instance, in the early part of 1950, Philip Murray, 
President of the oro, sent a request to the APL President, 
William Green, asking if the AFL would not consider another 
34 
Unity Conference. 
The Government restrictions especially the 
statutory provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act seemed grounds 
enough to prove that the oro leaders had been correct in 
their estimate of the need for political unity among the 
Labor Organizations of the nation. In the second place, 
since the removal of John L. Lewis from the Presidency in 
35 
1940, the OIO have expelled many of the Communist Unions, 
and some of the AFL leaders were admitting the value of 
Industrial organization. The OIO was drawn much closer 
to the conservative ideology of the An. Thus with the 
major philosophical differences settled, only the Juris-
dictional problem was left to prevent the unification. 
Of course, as was pointed out earlier, this had been the 
27 
main problem preventing unification since 1938. 
At the Unity Conference in early 1950, it was 
hoped that this problem could be solved to the satisfaction 
of both Organizations. However, the Conference was again 
stymied on the old problem. The AFL still stood steadfastly 
on the ground that only Organic Unity could solve the prob-
lems which Labor was facing in 1950. The CIO stood just 
as obstinately for Functional Unity. The Conference ended 
without a reasonable solution to this dilemma, when President 
Murray of the CIO became too ill to continue to attend the 
36 
meetings. 
However, a few months later in the early part of 
November of the same year, the CIO issued another invitation 
to the major Labor Organizations in the Country. ~is time 
Organized Labor was faced by such a serious threat to its 
existence that four of the top Organizations of the nation 
37 
accepted the invitation. 
The meeting which was to be held in December was 
called mainly because no Labor Leader had been g1 ven a high 
38 
post in the newly created Office of Defense Mobilization. 
This action was considered by the Labor Organizations to 
be discriminating against their importance in the nation's 
affairs. In the second place, this move by the national 
government broke the precedent set in the Second World War 
by ~resident Roosevelt when he appointed Sidney Hillman Co-
Chairman of Industrial Production. At that time the AFL 
I 
I 
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had complained about a CIO man being appointed. Now they 
had even more to complain about in that no Labor man was 
appointed. 
In 1950 there was also another factor with which 
Labor had to deal. President Truman announced in December 
that a new Manpower Agenoy was to be created in the Office 
of Defense Mobilization. T·his new agency was being created 
in order to obtain workers for the essential industries. It 
was also to be placed 1mder the direct control of Charles 11 
E. Wilson, who1rc the Labor Leaders knew, favored a system 
39 
of Manpower Draft. 
If a manpower draft were to be called, it would 
be possible that the Labor Organizations might have to give 
up their right to strike, for Labor drafted for its work 
might well be considered employed by the government and as 
40 
such prohibited by statute from striking. The Labor Orgsni-
,1 zations thus preferred to have control of Manpower placed 
in the Department of Labor under the direction of the Sec-
retary of Labor. 
If Organized Labor were to be saved from these 
coming controls, it would need adequate representation on 
the Wage Stabilization Board, as well as representation in 
11 the new Manpower Agency. As the Wage stabilization Board 
had been set up, it was given only advisory power with the 
41 
direct and final eay left completely to Wilson. With 
prices constantly rising throughout 1950, the Labor groups 
29_ 
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felt they had a right to wage increases which would allow 
them to maintain their standard of living. 
These were the problems which the Labor Organiza-
tions met to oonsider in December, 1950. It was clear that 
action had to be taken with a great deal of speed and without 
dissension from within the group itself. These factors 
were recognized by all the groups represented at the meeting. 
It was their decision which made it possible to attain unity 
along the Functional lines which bad been so long advocated 
42 
by the oro. 
The representatives of the APL at this time were 
quick to observe the need for unified action on any basis. 
However, the AFL representatives still could not feel them-
selves free to aocept Functional Unity without adding a 
condition to their acceptance. Thus they inserted a clause 
in the unification agreement, stating that when the purposes 
for which the United Labor Policy Commdttee was created had 
been accomplished, the participating organizations were to 
43 
be free to withdraw their support from that Commdttee. 
The CIO members readily agreed to this condition. 
They knew that unified. action had to be taken under any 
circumstances. They also felt that they had won a minor 
victory in obtaining the AFL consent to Functional unity 
no matter what reservations were placed on that acceptance. 
It might even prove to b~ the first step in obtaining an 
ultimate unity among Functional lines. 
30 
~o make sure that the complete unity of the 
Committee would be ascertained, another condition was imposed ' 
on the group by the members attending the December confer-
ence. This oondi tion demanded that all action to be taken 
44 
by the Committee be taken only upon a unanimous vote. 
Thus the fourteen member United Labor Policy 
Committee was formed after fifteen years segregation. It 
was formed because the Labor Organizations had been finally 
made to realize that the only way to save their remaining 
prestige would be to aot quickly upon the question of uni-
fication, and then prevent further detrimental action by 
the government in the Office of Defense Mobilization. 
Functional unity was accepted because it was the speediest 
way to obtain action. 
,, 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PROBL:EM OF WAGE STABILIZATION 
AND PRICE CONTROL 
Introduction 
In this chapter and in the following chapter, 
the success of labor unit7 through the action of the ULPO 
will be discussed. This diseussion of the issues of Wages, 
Prices and Manpower is pertinent to the whole body of this 
paper. It is necessary to underets.nd what ieeu.es had to 
be solved and how the7 were solved by ULPO action, if the 
main b1Pothesis of the paper is to be proved. 
Therefore, Chapters III and IV will deal in 
minute detail with the activities of the ULPO and its 
successes and failures on these issues. The Oo~ttee was 
set up to solve these problems for the groupe which the7 
represented. When they had settled these problems the ULPO 
had but one further objective to solve. When the New Defense 
Production Act (see Chapter V) failed all issues for which 
the Comadttee had been set up were solved. It was no longer 
of any real value to its members (see Chapters V and VI). 
Firat Action by ULPC 
The United Labor Policy Committee was no sooner 
formed for cper•tion on Labor's problems, than it was con-
fronted with a major problem in the issues of Wage and 
-35-
Price Controls. ~• United Labor Policy Committee members 
were quick to release the statement that they, as well as 
the rest of the Nation, were convinced of the need for these 1 
1 
controls. The Price Index as shown on the chart on page 37 
was the highest in the history of the United States, and 
throughout the ~ear of 1960 had been on a constant rise, 
despite all government efforts to control it. 
This rise in prices and the subsequent rise in 
wages to keep up with the prices was becoming one of the 
·most serious threats to the national econo~ since the peak 
2 
~ears during and immediately after the First World War. 
That period of inflation had ended in 1929 pitching the 
whole nation into a depression that lasted over seven years. 
By 1960, however, prices were on the rise and so 
were the tempers of the members of the Laboring groups. 
36 
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Cost of Living Rise 1950-51 
Total Cost Date :roo a. Clothing Rent of Livins 
June 1941 104.6 105.9 103.3 105.8 
June 1943 124.8 141.9 127.9 108.0 
June 1948 1'71.'7 214.1 196.9 11'7.0 
June 1949 169.6 204.3 190.3 120.6 
J&nUS17 1960 166.9 196.0 186.0 122.6 
June 1950 1'70.2 204.6 185.0 123.9 
August 1950 1'73.0 209.0 190.9 124.6 
September 1950 1'73.8 208.6 190.5 124.8 
October 1'74.8 209.0 193.4 ' 126.0 
November 1'15.6 209.5 195.0 125.4 
' December 1'18.4 215.4 196.4 125.8 
January 1951 181.6 221.6 199.'1 126.0 
february 184.2 226.0 203.2 126.8 
Jfareh 184.6 226.4 204.6 12'7.3 
April 184.5 224.6 206.2 12'7.'7 
:Ma,- 186.4 226.'7 206. '1 128.0 
3 ligures are Bureau of Labor statistics for 1941-1951. 
Thus the workers began to strike in many of the essential 
industries. The demand was always either for higher wages 
or for Escalator Clauses such as were granted to the United 
4 
Auto Workers in the Pall of 1950. 
This type of Union Bargaining to gain higher 
wages caused the manufacturers to raise the prices on their 
goocls. In turn the farmer wanted a higher parity for his 
1 products so tha:t by the end of 1950 that parity ha.d gone up 
5 
to its highest level in history. The whole process was 
becoming a vicious cycle causing the price index to sky-
rocket from 173.8 in September of 1950 to 181.6 in January 
of 1951. (See chart, page 37). With this price rise, Business 
· Profits reached a new record of $21.9 billion after taxes 
had been collected. This profit was one billion more than 
6 
that of the previous peak year of 1948. 
The price rises were the major concern of President 
Truman and his Democratic Administration in the 1!'all of 1950 
when the Defense Production Act was passed giving the President 
the power to establish a program of controls if he felt they 
7 
were necessary. 
!he President put his new power to almost immediate 
use by creating the Office of Defense Mobilization in Wovember 
8 
I of the same year. This new program of controls was also 
of major importance to the United .Labor Policy Committee. 
They immediately stated that they were in complete favor of 
II 
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suoh controls. However, they stipulated that wages should 
9 
be allowed to rise when prices rose. ~hey refused to ac-
cept a program of wage stabilization unless a co-ordinating 
control was put on prices. 
!he Labor .Leaders felt however that Charles E. 
Wilson was not controlling prices adequately. In their 
10 
opinion he was imposing strict wage controls without giving 
Labor adequate representation on the Wage Stabilization 
Board. 
The United Labor Policy Committee felt that the 
Wage Stabilization Board which had been set up in the Ec-
onomic Stabilization Agency under the directorship of Eric 
Johnston was not competent to handle the wage problem. In 
the first place the WBB was given only advisory power. It 
had no authority to handle wage disputes, nor did it have 
11 
any policy making duties. 
1! I 
Therefore even though three members of the Board 
were representatives of Organized Labor, they had no real 
control over what was to be done on the issues of Wage Con-
trol. Even Eric Jolmat.on was sympathetic toward Labor's 
plight when he publicly stated in January 1961 that he 
believed that Labor should be represented in the Defense 
13 
Program, if that program were to be sound. But Jolmston 
was not the final authority. Full control of the program 
had been placed in the hands of Wilson. President Truman 
in making this appointment had done so despite the formal 
39 
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I pleas made against it b7 :Murray of the CIO and Green of the 
AFL. By giving the complete control to Wilson the President 
' had made it a virtual dictatorship. Wilson was left with 
all the authorit.y to make or disregard any suggestion which 
was relative to Defense. 
Wage Limit Set. 
In February, 1951, after five weeks of dispute 
among the members of the WSB, the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion announced that a new Wage Freeze had been set. This 
Wage Freese was to allow a 10 per cent increase in salaries 
based on the period from June to December of 1950. The Wage 
14 
Freeze was to remain in operation until June of 1951. 
The Labor members of the WSB had fought bitterly 
They had at first asked that the I to prevent this order. 
t, Freeze be 15 per cent on the same base period, but the man-
agement members held out for 6 per cent. Both were willing 
to establish a catch-up period for those who were earning 
below the scale at the time the Wage Regulation would go 
15 
I 
I' 
II into effect. 
constant II The Labor group felt however that with the 
cost-of-living rise which was evident from the figures on 
the chart (page 31) that 6 per cent would not be large enough 
to cover these price rises. If the cost-of-living should 
continue to go up at the current rate, 3 points per month, 
as bad been the case between December, 1950 and Janusry,l951, 
then wage earners could onl~ expect to continue their present 
16 
standard of living until ~ of 1961. 
The Labor Group realised that if there were to 
be an all out war, then the whole population of the nation 
would have to make some sacrifices in their wa~ of life. 
This had been true during World War II when rationing went 
into effect under the administration of the Office of Price 
17 t 
Administration. Labor at that time had accepted the 
control, and had readil~ pledged itself to an all out 
18 
effort to obey the control. 
In the present situation, however, prices were 
not being effective.l~ controlled by any such strict program 
as rationing, nor was there apparentl~ any shortage which 
would necessitate the use of rationing. However, if there 
were such a need, then Labor would prefer to have rationing, 
19 
so that prices could be aa effectivel~ controlled as wages. 
In the present situation the Labor group felt that they were 
the only ones who were losing out on the profits being made. 
Price Control had to begin somewhere, but the 
Labor groups did not feel it should begin solel~ with them. 
tt was apparent that Business profits were soaring above 
those of any previous ~ear, despite the highest taxes in 
20 
history. Farm profits were also way above any ever 
known. To balance these profits wages had also risen, and 
on the whole the Standard of living was for the whole country 
well above that of any previous year. None of the groupe 
were willing to sacrifice profits, without first trying to 
cut down the other group. 
Thus Labor demanded that if their wages were to 
be controlled so should the profits of Business and Agri-
oul ture. However, since Wage Controls :were to be :put into 
/ 
effect, the Labor Members on the WSB :were willing to concede ,, 
21 
to the 15 per cent freeze mentioned earlier. 
The official statement by the United Labor Policy 
Committee summed up Labor's position on this fundamental 
issue- -
If wages are frozen while prices are 
permitted to rise, it will only weaken 
the army of protection and provoke all 
kinds of needless trouble. 22 
The answer, which management gave to Labor's 
demand for a 15 per cent wage allowance, was that due to 
high operating costs and increasingly high taxes they could 
23 
not afford to pay beyond the 6 per cent :which they offered. 
Yet despite taxes business profits were a billion dollars 
23 
higher than in the previous pe&k .year of 1948. Admittedly 
the value of the dollar was approximately only 50 per cent 
. 24 
of what it had been in 1941, still profits of over two 
billion Labor felt, gave some indication that Business was 
far from being on the verge of ruin due to the higb wages 
it was paying. 
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There was also anothe~ factor to be considered in 
the complaint that Business could not afford to pay more than ' 
six per eent increase~ in wagea. This was the fact that 
when a wage increase was allowed by the Government, it was 
usual to allow a proportionate increase in the price of the 
goods being sold so that the company would not lose anything 
25 
by the increase in wages. ~is general practice was fol-
lowed in the summer of 1951 when the United Auto Workers 
won a pay raise from Chrysler Corporation who immediately 
26 
raised their prices to cover the to.o9 per hour p~ raise. 
Nevertheless, the arguments in the Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board contin~ed with Labor steadfastly holding out for 
the 15 per cent, while Business continued to insist on 6 
II 
per cent. At this stalemate in the proceedings, Eric Jolmston 
11 
finally called upon the Board to try to compromise on a 
decision. In an official meeting called by Johnston both 
groups agreed to reconsider their demands. 
The Management groups agreed that in the face of 
the great need for wage and price control, they would be 
1 
willing to concede and agree on an 8 per cent increase. On 
the other band, Labor was willing to agree to an order es-
2'7 
tablishing a 12 per cent increase. This agreement was 
to be made with the understanding that ttnion contracts con-
taining escalator clauses would be enforced, along with 
28 
contracts calling for periodic pay raise, and fringe benefits. 
II 
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I The Jlanagement Group however was willing to honor the con-
29 
tracts only until the 8 per cent limit was reached. 
Both groups refused to make any further concessions. 
This refusal left the whole problem of the wage freeze up 
to Jolmston who took the matter up with Charles E. Wilson. 
After their conference it was decided that the Board should 
be allowed to vote upon the 10 per cent freeze decided upon 
by Wilson and Johnston. The Board voted six to tbree for 
30 
the 10 per cent order which was proposed. Wilson took 
this majority opinion of the Public and Management members 
of the Board as the basis for issuing the order establishing 
the 10 per cent Wage Freeze. 
Management in this case receivea a point advantage 
over the Labor Group as the Wage Order was four points higher 
than its original recommendation, while Labor lost five 
points from its first demand. Of course, Management con-
sidered it to be a v1otor7 of the Labor group, while Labor 
considered it to be an indication that Management would be 
favored in Wilson's program. The Public members voted for 
the 10 per cent freeze as a compromise to the situation which 
bad dragged on for f~•e weeks without indication of settle-
ment. 
This ruling on the Wage Freeze spelled the immedi-
ate end for Labor's participation in the Defense Administra-
tion under the old form. The Labor Members acting w1 th 
1
1
[ full support from the United. Labor Policy Commi tte.e left 
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their seats on all the Defense Agencies. They refused to 
return until President Truman altered both the composition 
31 
and duties of the Wage Stabilization Board. 
United Labor Policy Committee States Issues in Labor 
Withdrawal. 
All members of the Labor Organizations were in 
accord with the action taken by Labor in the controversy 
over the Wage Free.ze. The United Labor Policy Committee 
acting as La.~or•s spokesman on this issue stated that the 
move by the Labor members on the question of wage and price 
control was for the protection not only of Labor's interests, 
32 
but for the welfare of all the consumer groups in the nation. 
This statement by the ULPC was without a doubt 
made for propaganda purposes, but it nevertheless did contain 
elements of truth. It was based on the principle that wages 
could not be stabilized, while prices were allowed to rise 
without doing injury to the lower income groups, whose pur-
chasing power would subsequently be out as wages were kept 
at the same level, while prices were allowed to keep rising. 
The ULPC, after their withdrawal issued an u1 ti-
33 
matllDl to President !rmnan and Charles E. Wilson. In the 
first place the Labor members would not return to the WSB 
or any of the other defense posts until a new WSB was created 
with greater .power over the policies dealing with Wage 
Controls and disputes. They also asked for a more effective 
========~]·-==================== 
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control, stating that the system in effect 
under the Defense Production Act of June, 1950 did not pro-
vide the controls which were needed. Tbns they asked for 
34 
a new act in June, 1951. According to the Labor Publica-
tions the system in effect under the present law allowed 
35 
a 40 per cent increase in prices. 
No doubt there had been a substantial rise in 
prices since the Act was first passed, for from September, 
1950 to March, 1951 the price index went up 10.6 points. 
(See chart, page 37). This was nowhere near the price rise 
stated by L&bor, but nevertheless it ws.s evidence that the 
Defense Production Act had not imposed the control on prices 
which was desired by L•bor. 
The debate over the 10 per cent Wage Freeze 
dragged through February until the end of April, 1951. 
During this time President Truman, Eric Jolmston and his 
Labor aide, Harrison, worked to gain an acceptable program 
36 
for Labor. 
However, the ULPO ws.s adamant in its demands, 
claiming th&t Wilson had only his own interests at heart 
37 
and did not care for Labor's problems. Wilson, on the 
other hand, did not placate the Labor groups by fina11y 
38 
agreeing to appoint a Labor Aid to his personal staff. 
The Labor Representatives who were already incensed [ 
by the long drawn out disputes with Defense Mobilization 
I ==-~==~-,====~·===== 
1 
were not ready · to accept anything less than a full re-
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1 organization. The ULPO answered Wilson's offer with the 
I 
i 
I 
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statement that he knew nothing of the "Plain People or the 
Common Interest. 8 
This Labor hatred for Wilson reached a high peak 
by the time the Labor conference was held in Washington, 
40 
D~C·. on March 20, 1951. The ULPO at this time at a mass 
meeting of ~abor Representatives from the four Organizations 
which had formed the Committee announced their terms for 
Labor's return to the Defense Agencies. 
This program included all the basic points which 
the Labor groups had been demanding since the beginning of 
the dispute in Jan~y, 1951. First Labor asked for a new 
Defense Production Act in June, 1951; second, Real Price 
Control; third, a wage program which would be flexible 
enough to permit justice and equity to a nation of Wage 
Earners; and fourth, honoring all collective bargaining 
41 
agreements • 
The demand for a new Defense Production Act 
need not be discussed at this time as it is fully considered 
later. The second issue, price control, was one of the 
major issues in the original dispute over the Wage Freeze 
order. The cost-of-living bad risen steadily since the 
summer of 1950. Nearly all major groupe in the country 
were willing to admit the need for a system of price con-
trols. However, none of the groups waa willing to agree 
11 ,-~~~~=~===============~~= 
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upon whose prioes should be controlled. The Business group 
along with the Farmer wanted Labor controlled first. But 
Labor wanted to have business and farm profits out. How-
ever, the farmer pointed out that he could not cut his 
prices until the manufacturers cut the prices for their 
goods. The manufacturers claimed that they could not cut 
their prices as long as wages, t~ee and operating costs 
remained high. Of course, Labor could not give up its 
wage increases until the other costs had been cut. So 
the problem remained the one of who would be willing to 
make the sacrifice first. 
Thus price control remained the central problem 
preventing the stabilizing of the economy. Each of the 
groupe fighting the price control program had strong lobbies 
in Congress, and enough influence in the political life 
of the nation to infiuenoe tha.t Congress into voting for 
their programs. This is especially true of the farm bloc, 
which when combined with the Business Group controls two-
42 
thirds of the vote in Congress. Labor is essentially 
43 
a weaker pressure group on Congressional action. Thus it 
was that Congress in passing the Wew Defense Produotion 
Aot passed a bill which was actually not so strong as the 
previous Act. The pressures put on the Congress were too 
strong for the members to risk passing the etrioter act, 
1 and poesibly losing their seats in the House and Senate. 
I! 
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The seoond d8111omd of the ULPC was for a flexible I 
program of Wage Controls. This flexible plan would. be one 
which would allow wage increases to keep pace with rising 
prices. Under the U:LPO formula the wage increases would 
be allowed to rise in proportion to the monthly price index 
44 
published by the u.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In this 
way the Labor groups believed wages could be stabilized 
with an incentive toward price control. 
Labor felt that if price control were not imposed, 
then the cost•of-living index would continue to rise,eausing 
wages to rise. This then would prove an incentive to other 
groups, especially the Business groupe to control prices, 
if they wished to have wages controlled. Thus Labor felt 
there would be a program of control, along with a stronger 
Defense Production Act, which would be able to stabilize 
the nation's economy before it went beyond all control and 
resulted in a crash as it did after the period of inflation 
during the 1920's. 
The ULPO's last proposal was one which was formed 
in order to protect the Labor Organizations' interests in 
the field of collective bargaining. It would require that 
the Business groups honor all existing Union Contracts. 
This provision was inserted into the ULPO conditions, because 
of the arguments which had occurred during the disputes 
between the Management a.nd Labor Groups on the WSB. At If 
tb8.t time Management had tried to break the existing con ir-a..ds [1 
II 
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by providing that wage increases be allowed only up to 8 
per cent, despite the existing agreements. Thus contracts 
providing escalator clauses, periodic pay raises, and fringe 
benefits, would have been voided after the 8 per cent had 
45 
been granted. 
At the washington Conference Labor had a fifth 
obJective which was not officially stated. They were de-
termined to have Charles E. Wilson either removed from his 
office, or else have his power over the Defense Program 
severely out. The hatred which the Labor Group had for 
Wilson was very evident throughout all the disputes which 
46 
had occurred since the formation of the ULPC. The Labor 
Organizations were determined that Wilson should never again 
be allowed to establish a Wage Freeze without first obtain-
ing the consent of Labor. Wilson tbns became the symbol of 
"Big Business" and all else that was anti-labor. All the 
venom of the Labor group was concentrated on this one man. 
In fact, James Carey, President of the International Elec-
tric Union (CIO), threatened that hie union would strike 
at General Electric, Wilson's own plant, if Wilson continued 
47 
his policy of enforcing the 10 per cent Wage Freeze. 
These demands of the ULPC were brought to President II 
Truman in the latter part of March, 1951. The President, 1l 
who had been deeply concerned ·over the trouble in the Office [ 
of Defense Mobilization,met with the members of the ULPC 
to discuss plans for a new policy to be formed for Defense. 
t I 
I 
\ 
I 
1-=--;h: ~-~s~~~nt bad 1 ==~~- ---~-~;!=-~- ·~~ originally promised that Labor would have 
a representative in the Office of Defense Mobilization. That 
representation h&d never been given to Labor by Charles~. 
Wilson who broke his promise to the President when he did 
48 
not give a top advisory post to one of the Labor Leaders. 
President Truman knew that politically he was 
facing an exceedingly dangerous situation when he met with 
the ULPO. Wilson was his ehoioe for the position of Defense 
Mobilizer. He h&d guaranteed that Wilson would have full 
control of the mobilization. If the President were to go 
I' back on his word to Wilson now, he would have two groups, 
Labor and Management, remembering his failure to keeJl his 
word on important }')olit ical issues. 
This situation confronting President Truman made 
it necessary for him to give Wilson his complete support, 
while at the same time placating the ULPC when he met with 
them at the Wbite House. The President solved the problem 
I! by granting most of the Labor requests while still leaving 
I 
I 
I 
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Wilson in almost sole charge of the Jlrogrsm. 
In the first place, the President promised that 
he would ask Congress for a new Defense Production Act in 
June. He then promised to set up a new Board in the Office 
of Defense Mobilization to study and report on the problems, 
especially in Wage Stabilization and Price Control, that 
Labor had met during the time of its participation in the 
Defense Program. 
I 
I 
II 
II 
This new Board which was to be known as the 
49 
National Advisory Board was to have seventeen members, 
50 
4 Agri<ml ture. George 4 Labor, 4 Management, 4 Public, and 
51 
w. Taylor, was appointed chairman, but President Truman 
agreed to attend the meetings once per month. 
The first problem handled by the new Board was 
the investigation of Labor's request for a new and stronger 
WSB. After a month's stu~ the Board on April 20, 1951 
voted 12•4 for a WSB which would be given the power to 
handle Labor Disputes involving Union Seouri ty and all 
Contract Disputes. The Board was also to make the policy 
52 
for determining the Wage Stabilization Program. 
The 10 per cent formula was to be left in effect 
until the Board had opportuni 't7 to study the cost-of-living 
rises. Then the Board would have the power to lift the 
freeze, and grant wage increases in exceptional cases. Thus 
by August, 1951, the Board had agreed to grant a 2 per cent 
pay increase if the cost~of-living continued to rise. It 
was possible, too, in the summer of 1951 to obtain Board 
decisions on pay raise above the two per cent. The Board 
also granted the right to bargain collectively for escalator 
53 
clauses in August, 1951. 
Therefore the ULPC gained their major objectives 
on the problem of Wage Stabilization. The new Board was II 
given all the power the ULPO had originally demanded that 
it have. By the summer of 1951 the 1! per cent order which 
52 
Labor had demanded for Wage Stabilization was granted, as 
was their demand that all existing contracts be honored by 
the Management group. 
The ULPO did not manage, however, to have Charles 
E. Wilson removed fro.m his office. They did nevertheless 
have his power and authority out. The National Advisory 
Board which had been created by President Truman was em-
powered to hear and report on all problems pertaining to 
the Defense Program. In the second place. Wilson was re-
54 
quired to have a Labor Advisor on his Personal staff. 
In the third instance, although Wilson was left in direct 
charge of the progrgm, he alone was riot left the final de-
cision over the Wage program as had been the case when the 
agency was first created. 
These limitations placed over Wilson's control 
of the Defense program of course limited the effectiveness 
of the administration of that program by creating an Office 
set up where there was no direct line of responsibility. 
Wilson was left in office to control the defense economy 
of the nation. Yet he now could not completely control the 
Wage policies made by his own office. The Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board first had to consider and investigate all issues 
before Wilson could act. 
Wilson had been given complete control of the 
other aspects of the Defense program. Technically he still 
was in sole control. But President Truman had created the 
---------------------------------
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Wational Advisory Board which was to study and report to 
him on all phases of the Defense Program. This agency of 
n, 
course was given,,direct power to control any decision made 
by Wilson. Never theless, any decision which they did not 
believe to be correct would be reported to the President, 
thus stepping over Wilson's authority. This had been the 
case on their decision setting up the new WSB. 
Thus Wilson's power to direct the Defense Program 
was much more limited in comparison to what it had been when 
he first took office as Defense Mobilizer. The authority 
within his office was divided between himself as head of 
the Program and the WSB which now partially controlled the 
wage program. He also was subject to investigation by the 
National Advisory Board. Lastly, he was required to listen 
to the advice of his Labor aid on Labor issues. 
Wilson bad tbns lost a great deal of his original 
power due to the Labor Walkout. The campaign by the ULPC 
in the two months which follGWed had evidently made a great 
impression on the President for he agreed to most of their 
major demands. Of course, this agreement was the only 
possible move for the President to follow in this case. It 
was a move of political expedience, for the President needed 
the support of the Labor group, if he were to be successful 
in his political campaigns of the future. As the Democratic 
Party leader he was committed to the support of the Labor 
group. He bad already failed to keep one promise to Labor 
54 
when the Office of Defense Mobilization had been created. 
It might have been political suicide for him to fail to 
grant most of the ULPC demands when he met with them in 
55 
Karch. 
United Labor's Reaction to the Wew Set Up. 
The ULPC left their conference with President 
Truman well satisfied with the results. However. they 
still had one more program to put into effect before they 
could consider their work done. 
They had managed to have the new WSB created and 
g1 ven the powers which they had first demanded that it have. 
They had also obtained the guarantee of Free Manpower (See 
next Chapter). They had managed to have Wilson's power over 
the Defense Program substantially cut. 
Thus the Labor representatives went back to their 
positions well satisfied with the results gained in wages 
and prices which their program of unity had obtained for 
them. However. there was still one great issue in the 
minds of Labor to be settled in the passing of a new and 
stronger Defense Production Act. The President had promised 
that this would be done. 
Labor felt that only this new act would completely 
accomplish the ends of establishing a strong defense admin-
istration. Congressional action was needed to give the 
nation's sanction to Wage and Price Control. The President 
and Labor believed that only Congressional action would give 
55 
the program effective control. To obtain this action, 
however, would mean that all groups in the nation would 
have to support the law. The Farm group would have to 
sacrifice their high parity and Business would have to be 
willing to sacrifice some of the high profits which it had 
be en making. 
The ULPO realized these blocks in the path of 
the passing of the New Act. Therefore they began a eampaign 
in May, 1951 to publioize and obtain support for their pro-
gram. This,however,was a plan which was not to succeed. 
The ULPC was not to be strong enough politically to overcome 
the pressures of Business, Farm and Dixiecrat groups in 
the Legislature. (See Chapter VI on Defense Production 
Act). 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE :M.ANPODR ISSUE 
Introduotion. 
The Second Major issue calling for ULPC action 
during the time that Committee was in existence was the 
Manpower agency which was to be established in the Office 
of Defense Mobilization. In fact, one of the main reasons 
,, for formation of the ULPO was the announcement by President 
Truman that a Manpower Agency was to be established. This 
announcement in fact was the final incentive which brought 
1 
li 
about the Labor Unity of the ULPO. 
The Labor groups were certain that if a new 
Manpower Agency were to be created in the Offioe of Defense 
Mobilization, the Director of that office would be given the 
power to draft Labor if a real manpower shortage should de-
velop, in the nation. The Labor Leaders felt, therefore, 
that if Labor were to be drafted, Labor should, at least, 
2 
be represented on the Agency that was to be given this power. 
Of course, the ULPC actually did not approve of 
the proposed draft on any grounds. It was argu.ed by the 
Labor Leaders that Free Labor had always produced more than 
the conscript system and that the worker should be all~ed 
3 
to work in whichever section of the country that he desired. 
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The program of Conscript Labor proposed by 
Charles E. Wilson was essentially rather mild. It was to 
obtain Labor for needy areas of the nation. If, for in-
stance, a town in one area had an essential industry which 
needed workers and there were laborers of the type needed 
within that area, then they could .not be required to leave 
the area, but only to change jobs, The salary would not be 
lower than in the previous work. 
However, it was possible that Labor would be 
needed in other sections of the country. In this ease, 
the worker might possibly have been required to move to 
the new section. This requirement was one of the ones to 
which the ULPC, speaking for the organized Labor groups, 
objected. 
The ULPC felt tbat Charles E. Wilson would have 
too much control over the activities of the individual worker 
if he were given the power to move workers from their homes 
and present jobs. Thus the ULPO argued against the Labor 
4 
draft which was proposed. 
On the whole. the issue centered around the power 
which bad been given to Wilson as head of the Office of 
, Defense Mobilization. It was the same type of situation 
. ,I 
which had occurred over the issue of Wage Stabilization 
and Price Control. The Labor Leaders wanted the control 
of Defense and Labor policies in the hands of those groupe 
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which they knew would be favorable to Labor's interests. 
They did not believe that a Manpower Agency set up under 
the full authority of Charles E. Wilson who had made the 
proposal for a Labor Draft would prove to be .for the best 
interests of their group. 
Why Have a Draft? 
Charles E. Wilson first announced that he believed 
a Labor draft might be needed in December of 1950• Through-
out 1950 a growing labor shortage in essential industries 
had been threatening to cut down the needed production quota 
during the Korean Crisis. Wilson proposed that the draft 
go into effect as soan as the New Manpower Agency which was 
to be created in the office of Defense Mobilization was 
3 
established. 
A draft of Labor had not been needed even during 
World War II. However, the situation during the Korean Crisis 
presented a muoh different type of situation from that of 
the earlier case. At th.e outbreak of World War II there had 
. 6 
8,000,000 unemployed workers in the United States. It was 
not until 1944 that this reserve of workers was completely 
used up by the defense industries. Then the solution of 
•I the War Manpower Commission and the Department of Labor was 
found in .the job freeze orders suoh as the one issued in 
1943 and which was administered by the oertifioate system 
used by the United States Employment Service in order to 
I' 
II 
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allocate workers to new positions. However, there was no 
compulsion used on the worker in order to make him take the 
8 job to which he was sent. 
The War :Man})ower Commission an.d Sel&ctive Service 
Board also worked together during the War in order to estab-
lish a draft deferment system for workers in essential indus-
9 
tries. A third method used for controlling the ~n})ower 
shortage was that of allocating materials to the essential 
industries. Then of course the working hours were lengthened 
in order to stretch the number of })reduction hours . ·· Of 
course, Industr7 was required tbp~ time and halffof overtime 
work, but the lengthening of the work week served the purpose 
. 10 
of increasing })reduction. 
A final method used to increase production during 
the war years was to bring unem})loyed women into the })lants 
of the nation. In this way 3'1.3 })er cent of the nation's 
11 
women were brought into the defense industries. 
These measures when combined with the in•service 
training programs were equal to the task of keeping Wartime 
production to a level never before reached in the United 
States. During the War more goode were produced in the 
12 
United States than in any other nation in the world. Still 
the Labor force was not fully mobilized. Many workers were 
left in areas where there was little or no need for their 13 . 
skills. Thus West Coast Industries such as Boeing and 
Douglas Aircraft, and the Kaiser Shipyards scoured the country 
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for skilled Labor. 
The main reason for this shortage in the Western 
areas was the immobility of Labor. The Eastern worker did 
not wish to leave his home, family, and friends to go into 
a new section of the country to a job which would in all 
probability be only temporary. This basic fear for his 
security kept him in hie old surroundings, despite the 
tempting offers of higher wages and better working conditions 
in a new plant in another section of the country. 
It would be difficult to estimate the number of 
workers who were kept at home despite the obanoe to further 
their eoono.mio gains, but it is certain that great numbers 
who should have moved into the needy areas did not do so. 
~us the production figures during the War were lower than 
14 
they would have been with full mobilization. 
This was the same type of situation which prevailed 
during the Korean Crisis. However, at the beginning of 
World War II, there bad been a reserve labor supply of 
15 
a,ooo,ooo. In June, 1950 there were only 2.2 million job 
16 
seekers in the United States. Secretary of Labor Tobin 
estimated that over 4,000 1 000 workers would be needed before 
17 
the end of 1951. 
Labor Leaders felt that there were possible solu-
tions to the problem other than the draft of Labor advocated 
by Wilson. However, in December, 1950 he refused to listen 
to the pleadings of the Labor Organizations who asked that 
64 
he place the new Manpower Agency under the direction of 
Secretary of Labor Tobin. Tobin would head a tripartite 
18 
advisory board of Labor, Management, and Public Members. 
The ~power Problem. 
This controversy over the Manpower problem arose 
at the same time as did the tuarrele over the Wage Stabiliza- , 
tion program. Therefore the February Walkout from the de-
fense agencies was actually as mueh concerned with the lllan• 
power difficulties as with Wages and Prices, although these 
latter two issues overshadowed the former at that time. 
From Labor's point of view it was undeniable 
that Wilson had been parti oularly overbearing in his attitude 
.1 toward both these Labor problems. At first appearances it 
1
1 
might be difficult to understand Wilson's actions in the 
Defense Administration. Re had handled similar diffi~ult 
problems during his service on the War Labor Board and in 
his position ae President of the General Electric Company. 
Perhaps, however, Wilson~a attitude on this 
problem was fear of Labor's power. Re might have feared 
that, if Labor were given too much say in the defense pro-
gram, that it would injure the Management interests of the 
nation. If Wilson did have this attitude, it eould probably 
be traced to the trouble he had in his own plant in the 
years immediately following World War II. In the first 
place, a great number of the old United Electric Workers 
I 
- t 
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were members of the so~called Communist dominated CIO unions. 
After the War the OIO began its policy of weeding out those 
Communists. In the process the General Electric Company was 
hard hit by the disputing unions. Finally, the CIO with the 
help o"f Secretary of Labor Tobin, managed to win the control 
of the plants, but the Communist dominated United Electric 
19 
also still remained in the industry. Tbns Wilson was 
plagued with continuous strikes, and Labor Wars in his own 
Oompa.n7 during the late 1940's. B7 1950 when he took control 
of the Defense Program, he wanted full control of Labor with 
as little interference from Organized Labor as possible. 
However, by tha time the ULPC was making its 
demands for free labor on the basis that in the Capitalist 
System, the incentive of competition was the reason for high 
production rates achieved in the United States in the past 
and would be more useful in the future, providing that Labor 
remained free. Wilson was not ready to listen to the argu-
ments which the ULPO was putting up to protect Labor. 
However, before the new Manpower Agency had been 
completely set up, the ULPO and Wilson had come to the contro-
versy over Wage Stabilization. The Manpower problem was 
thus shoved into the background. Nevertheless the ULPO con-
tinued, with the help of the Secretary of Labor to make 
plans for easing the Manpower shortage, while still keeping 
Labor free. 
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In the ~iret place, it was pointed out by Tobin, 
the situation was not so dark as had been originally estimated. 
There was not as much demand for Labor as it had been esti-
mated there would be in 1950. The Department of Labor issued 
the eta tement, after making a.n intensive study, that there 
would be no shortage which could not be overcome, if the 
20 
armed services did not take over 5,000,000 men. There 
would be an adequate Labor supply providing that the 3,000,000 
unemployed were used in essential jobs. If then, th work 
21 
week were lengthened to the 45 hour average of Worla War II, 
the results would be the same as adding 1.8 million workers 
to the Labor force. Of course, if the work week were to be 
lengthened without changing the statutor.r provision provid-
1 ing for the time and a half pay ~or overtime work, then the 
same controversy with management would be likely to arise as 
during World war II, when the complaints about their inability 
22 
to pay and still make a profit flooded the administration. 
A second dif~iculty with the time and a half pay was that it 
would still further raise prices, unless a strict tax system 
were set up, and rationing was again used to prevent ex-
cessive buying. However, if the demand ~or Manpower became 
too great, Labor felt that the lengthened work week would be 
one of the solutions to solving the shortage for Labor. 
Another measure for gaining a greater Labor supply 
would be to bring women and elderly persons back into the 
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Labor Force. Many of these people are skilled Labor, having 
learned trades during World War II, when they filled Jobs 
vacated by men who went into the armed services. It is 
estimated by the Department of Labor that an additional 
23 
38,000,000 could be added to the Labor Foroe. However, 
a great many of the women in this number now have small 
1 children to care for due to the high marriage rates during 
the war. The number of children had been much smaller during 
the second World War, because the marriage rates during the 
depression had been exceedingly low. However, if need be, 
this problem eould be solved, as it had been during the War, 
by the establishment of nursery schools in order to take care 
of the children of working mothers. This method proved very 
successful in Great Britain during the War. 
In addition to these measures, training programs 
could be set up by the industries and the government..> and 
advertising campaigns stressing the need for skilled Labor 
could be instituted, along with the allocation of scarce raw 
materials to the essential industries. This was done during 
the second World War in order to force the non•essential in-
24 
dustries to out down on their help. Then the nBES could 
send workers to plants in which they were needed, using the 
25 
certificate system of World War II. Draft deferments could 
also be used to obtain people for the essential industries. 
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The final recommendation made by the Department 
of Labor, acting in cooperation with the ULPC, was that a 
Fair Employment Practices Law be passed by the Congress so 
that discrimination against certain groups would not keep 
the skilled Labor of these workers from helping relieve the 
26 
Lab or shortage. 
O"f eourse, FEPC has already been turned down 
twice in the Senate by filibuster, which prevented the issue 
from ever coming to a vote, and unless a new Cloture rule, 
requiring lese than the two•thirds vote of the Senate to 
close debate is passed, it is unlikely that 7EPC will ever 
be open to vote. Since many members of the Senate have for 
years tried to introduce a new cloture rule, it seems un-
27 
likely,too, that that will ever come to pass. 
Thus when the ULPC met with President Truman in 
March, they had more to discuss than wages and prices. They 
were ready to present these statistics and arguments to the 
President in order to protest against Wilson's newly created 
28 
Jlanpower Agency, and his proposed Labor draft. 
Manpower Results. 
After President Truman discussed the situation 
with Wilson and the ULPC, it was agreed following investiga-
tion by the National Advisory Board that Labor, for the time 
being, at least should remain free. Wilson had agreed to 
appoint the Labor advisor to his sta"ff, and also consented 
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to a new advisory committee on Manpower. 
This new committee was to be headed by Arthur 
Flemmi ng, Wilson's own choice for Manpower Administrator. 
It was to have equal representation tram Labor, Public, 
29 
Agricultural, and Management groups. The committee was 
to study and advise the Office of Defense Mobilization's 
Manpower head, Arthur Flemming and the Department of Labor's 
30 
choice, Frank Graham , on the question of Manpower. Thus 
the authority to direct the program was again split between 
the Department of Labor and. the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
31 
t ion, as had been the ease during World War II. 
The practice of allocating material and job defer-
ments was to be continued, as was the job freeze. It was 
gnara.nteed that there would be no Conscript Labor unless no 
32 
other practical solution was left. 
This new program on Manpower was not a complete 
success for Labor, for they had demanded full control by 
the Department of Labor. However, it was a substantial 
partial victory for the ULPO. They had again accomplished, 
33 
as they had in the program of Wage Stabilization, to cut 
down Wilson r s power over the Defense Program. In this case 
he no longer had full control over Manpower. This control 
This action occasioned by the ULPO Walkout in 
February and Karch of 1951 had served not only to out down 
Wilson's power, but it also prevented the Office of De~ense 
Mobilization from taking any quick and decisive steps in 
the Labor field. The new splits in the agency, allocating 
power to the WSB and to the Department of Labor would cut 
down the efficiency of the original Wilson set up. All 
issues now had to be reported on by Committee action before 
a move could be made to correct any troubled situation which 
occurred. Committees are of course slow in coming to de-
cisions. This slowness is due to the need for discussion 
before any question can be settled. In fact, it was Committee 
quarreling and final stalemate that had made Wilson first 
34 
establish the 10 per cent wage freeze order. 
However, this slowing of the processes would no 
doubt be profitable to the ULPC and the Labor Organizations, 
for now no action could be taken without a first consulta-
tion with their representatives. Thus there was an oppor-
tunity for bargaining on issues, which they did not have 
before the ULPC had obtained the new concessions from the 
President. It also,from Labor's point of view, was a more 
democratic method to settle disputes by vote taken from the 
groups represented in the dispute. 
Outcome of No Draft. 
By August of 1951, it appeared that the ULPC 
and the Department of Labor had been correct in their 
estimate that no draft would be needed at this time to 
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prevent a Labor shortage. In June of 1951 the manpower 
situation was much brighter than it had been in June of 
1950. To be sure there were only three quarters of a 
million people on the unemployed lists. But the armed 
ser vices were planning to release 500,000 reservists. 
There were also 350,000 veterans completing their schooling 
35 
and planning to enter the Labor force. 
The work week still was only averaging 40.6 hours. 
Thus there was the possibilit,y of lengthening it to the 
45.2 average which had been obtained during World war II. 
If this were to be done, then 1.8 million man hours would 
36 
be added to the industrial production. 
~e women and elderly people of the nation had 
not yet been fully mobilized. Draft deferments, material 
allocations and in-service training programs had served to 
help push production figures up to a higher rate than during 
1950. 
Tbns there was still no need tor the manpower 
draft. It was possible that sometime a situation might 
become serious enough to warrant the taking of this measure. 
However, in August. 1951, it seemed unlikely that it would 
be needed during the Korean Crtsis. Thus the ULPO -was 
assured that its second major problem had b~en solved for 
the present time at least. 
72 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See Chapter I. 
2. American Federationist, "United Labor Asks Fair Play," 
p.5. American ?ederation of Labor, washington, 
n.c., April, 1951. 
3. Ibid. 
4. New York Times, "The Labor Walkout." 
-- ~imes,!nc., lfew York, Sunday, March 4, 1951, 
Section IV. 
5. See Chapter III· 
6. Business Week, "On Manpower- No Rules ", p. 120. 
MoGra.w-!!il1 Company, New York; 
February 17, 1951. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
-
Nicho11e, William H., and Vieg, John A., Wartime Govern-
ment in Oie·ra.tion, PP• 40-50. 
PEira.ailp ia: Blakiston Company, 1944. 
N~tion, "The Manpower Balance Sheet~ P• 125. 
Nation Associates, New York. 
Februar7 10, 1951. 
u.s. News and World Report, "How to Get Enough Workers," 
-- ~S:-lfews Publishing Company, New York. 
Deoember 15, 1950. 
Business Week, ~· cit., P• 120. 
u.s. News, ~· cit., "Job Freeze Sha)ee Up", p. 36. 
- - Januar7 ~ 1951. 
New York Times Jlas;zine, "Making the Most of Manpower," 
- --pp.13 !1. ew fork Tim•e Inc., New York. 
May 13, 1951. 
See page /;;J_, 
Nation, ~· cit., P• 36. 
Ibid. 
73 
18. American Federationist, ~· cit., "Should Labor Be 
Ignored?" p, 9. 
19. 
January, 1951. 
UE v.s. Oompant Unionism. Publication no. 148, pp. 3-23. 
-- Unitedlectrical and Machine Workers of 
America, New York, 1949. 
20. Nation, ~· cit., P• 125. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
Business Week, .QP.• cit., "Stretching the Labor Supply," 
P• ~Julj" l:r,-!'951. 
Nicholls, ~· cit., PP• 23-25. 
Business Week, ~· cit., P• 28. 
u.s. News, ~· cit., p. 36. 
Ibid. 
-
lfew Reiublic, ''Manpower for Defense," P• 9. 
---a1tori&1 Publications, washington, D.o. 
February 6, 1951. 
Ibid. 
-
See Chapter III for Truman Conference. 
OIO News, "OIO Will Be Represented on New Manpower 
- --xgency," P• 3. 
Congress of Industrial Organization, 
Washington, D.o., May 7, 1961. 
Ibid. 
-
Nicholls, ~· cit., P• 20. 
American Federationist,~. cit., "Labor Joins a Top 
Lev$l Board," P• ~ 
April, 1951. 
See Chapter III. 
See Chapter I. 
Business week, 2,l• ill•• P• 28. 
I 
I 
jl 
II 
I 
II 
74 
CHAPTER V 
THE !'mAL DAYS OF ULPC 
.!CTIOW 
1 
ULPC's Last Campaign: A New De~ense Production Act. 
With the battle for a new WSB and more representa-
tion gained for organized Labor on all the defense agencies, 
the ULPC prepared to force Congressional action on a new 
and stricter Defense Production Act. The ULPC had stated 
after the Truman conference in March that the President 
had agreed that if an adequate program of controls were to 
2 
be obtained, a more powerful Act would be needed. 
The ULPC after that March Conference with President 
Truman was confident that the President would keep his word 
to do all in his power in order to see that the u.s. Congress 
passed a new Act in June, 1951 before· the Act passed in 1950 
3 
expired. 
Therefore in the early part of May, 1951, the 
ULPC made the announcement that Organized Labor was to 
support a stronger Defense Production Act. The ULPC urged 
all the wo!'"king olassee of the country to write to their 
4 
representatives in Congress in favor of the new Act. 
This new Aot whieh was proposed by Truman and 
supported by Organized Labor would impose stronger controls 
-75-
on prices, rents and wages thu s affecting not only Labor, 
but all groups in the nation. It would establish a 
strivter program forthe control of inflation. The original 
Defense Production Act, passed in September, 1950, gave 
the President ~he power to creat e a new agency in order 
to control the defense program. 'T'he President by the 
authority givan him in th!s Ac t had t he power to establish 
· a system of priority allocations, i mpose controls on 
consumer buying, control wages and prices, and establish 
5 
a system of manpower con~rols. 
This Act, however, did not give the President 
t he power to cut the profits which were being made at that 
time by Business. 'I'hus prices could not be stabilized 
6 
below their highest urevious peak. 
This new Act therefore did not give the President 
the power 'Nhich he asked to establish a system of price 
control which was desired by the ULPC. Farm prices, like 
Business Profits,could not be stabilized below their 
7 
previous high peak. Business profits could not be im-
paired. In fact, the only price this Act actually gave 
the President the power to control was the price of Labor. 
The only limitation wa s that wages could not be cut below 
8 
those provided in prevlous statutes. 
The Government was also allowed to make loans 
to private industry in order to speed u p Defense Production, 
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but it was not allowed to build factories and run them on 
government funds. The sole control put on hoarding was 
the provision for a $10,000 fine or a year in prison or 
9 
both. 
Thus none of the controls provided for by the 
Act gave the President an adequate legislative background 
with which to plan effectively to control infiation. l!'arm 
Parity was at the highest in history. Business profits 
10 
were also at their highest level in history. Yet the 
Defense Production Act which was passed in order to give 
the President the power to control this inflation, did not 
give him the authority to cut back on the profi te made by 
either of these two groups. 
~e government was also prevented from interfering 
with private industry profits in the provision in the Act 
allowing loans to industry, but not allowing the government 
to build and operate plants at a lower rate, so as to force 
other industry to out down on prices. Finally, the Aot 
did not give the President the authority to control hoarding, 
so that black market buying and selling could be governed, 
No large company was afraid of the $10,000 fine, nor were 
they afraid of the jail sentence. This provision had been 
found too weak to be effective in previous acts such as 
11 
the NIR! and the Taft-Hartley Law. The companies had 
found by experience that the provision was on the whole 
rather harmless; $10,000 meant little to businesses 
throughout the country who had just completed a year with 
12 
the highest profits in history despite taxes. 
The Wew Act Proposed by Truman and Labor. 
Thus the ULPC and President Truman designed what 
they hoped would be an Act which would give the President 
greater control over the defense program. The President 
asked first that he be given the authority to build factor-
ies on government funds, so that defense production could 
be speeded up, and prices for essential goods could be more 
adequately controlled by government setting the market value 
13 
from its own plant prices. 
Second, the President asked the power to use 
differential ~bsidiee, eo that the producers o~ essential 
materials could keep up their present profits while charging 
lower prices for their goode, thus helping to keep the in-
14 
flationary spiral down to the present level. The President 
also asked for a stronger Price Control provision, along 
with greater rent control. He wanted Farm Parity and Busi-
ness Profits held at their 1950 level. With those measures 
the President felt that at least he would be able to begin 
a program of Price Control, and begin also to control in-
15 
flation. 
The ULPO agreed with the recommendations made 
by the President, al though they had desired a stronger 
policy for the controlling of Farm Parity, and a more direct 
statement by the President on price control. 
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However , the President in hie message to Congress 
realized that the majority of the Legislature was not favor-
able to his proposal, nor to him personally. A Congressional 
majority was by this time controlled by the coalition of 
Republicans and Dixiecrats, who had banded together to ex-
16 
press their mutual dislike for the President. 
Therefore the President made his moderate proposal 
in order to obtain at least a little more control of the 
Defense progrgm than he had during 1950-51. He evidently 
was afraid that if he asked for a stronger and more explicit 
Act, the Congress would give him no improvements at all. 
Even with this proposal, it is probable that the President 
realized that there was little hope of obtaining all that 
he asked. 
Con~eseional Action. 
The Congress put off their action on the Defense 
Production Act until just before the old Act was due to 
expire in June, 1951. When the Bill for the new Act was 
brought to the Floor,&d•ebate which lasted nearly two weeks 
took place . As had been expected, the Dixiecrat-Republioan 
coalition fought all the provisions asked for by Truman, 
17 
and then added some new ones of their own. 
Thus as the Debate in the Senate over the Truman 
proposal began, Senator Walter George of Georgia (D) de-
clared - "Rollbacks would stagnate business." Senator 
79 
Maybank of South Carolina (D) agreed when he said, "Author-
ity to roll back prices should not be in the White House." 
Thus the Dixiecrats showed their position on the Aot. 
However, it was Republican Senator Capehart from 
Indiana who drafted the no roll back clause which was finally 
inserted into the Act and the provision which prevented a 
roll back on all prices except those which were unreasonable 
18 
and excessive. This rollback amendment was not only 
supported by the Republican and Dixiecrat members of Congress, 
but it was also favored by the Farm Bloc. Tbus majority 
House Leader Ernest Mao~arland of Oregon voted for the pro-
19 
vision as did Democratic Whip, Lyndon Jolm of Texas. 
The ~arm Bloc of course was voting to protect their 
parity. DiSalle, Price Administrator , had early in June, 
1951 issued a rollback of 4 per cent on Beef Prices. The 
Beef raiser refused to ship to market unless the order were 
revoked. Thus the stockyards wer e emptied while the farmers 
and stock owners waited for Congress to act. 
The ~arm Bloc of course had a great deal at stake 
in their Parity gains. The Farm group in the United States 
had been almost completely bankrupt since the defeat of the 
~opulist Party in the election of 1896. Most of the farms 
in the nation carried heavy mortgages in 1910 when 33 per 
20 
cent of farmer s were on the verge of losing their farms. 
This situation persisted into the 1930's when President 
Roosevelt began the policy of Farm subsidy and Parity. This 
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saved many of the nation's farmers from losing their homes. 
When World War II came, the farmer began to make his first 
profits in fifty years . The situation continued with food 
21 
prices constantly rising. Thus the Farm Bloc fought savage-
ly for higher and higher Parity. They felt they were owed 
a profit for all the years of suffering. 
Thus the coalition of t he Dixiecrats and Republi-
cans in Congress combined with the Farm Bloo in order to 
defeat the President and Labor. Labor had controlled only 
one"tenth of the vote in Congress due to the fact that al-
though one-third of the popUlation is composed of the labor-
i ng classes, the set up of Congressional districts in the 
United States gives them only one•tenth of the representation. 
22 
Twenty~five states are in the Farm Bloc areas. 
This proved to be too great a handicap for the 
ULPO to overcome. The President and Organized Labor were 
outvoted by the other pressure groupe of the nation. Con-
gressmen had to follow the dictates of their own constitu-
encies in this Crisis. In the United States sectional in-
fluence seems to be too strong to be overcome by Party 
1 lines. The vot e of the Farm Bloc and the Dixiecrats on 
the Defense Production Act was a prime example of this 
t endency towards sectionalism. 
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Thus the President and the ULPC had to admit 
defeat. The President signed the Defense Production Act 
which provided the same controls as the original Act except 
for the fact that the Capehart Amendment had been added. 
The President signed with the statement that it was the 
worst measure he had ever signed, but the need for controls 
was too great to allow him to veto it, as the ULPC bad 
23 
asked him to do. 
The ULPC had lost its fight to obtain stronger 
controls with a new Defense Production Act. This was the 
last measure mentioned in the December contract of the four 
Labor Organizations participating in ULPC action. Tech-
nically then the work for which the ULPC had been formed 
was over. 
The new Act signed by the President was to be in 
effect for one year more. It allowed rente to rise 20 per 
24 
cent in the summer of 1951. Beef prices because of the 
25 
failure of the rollback went up 24 per cent. The Chrysler 
automobile prices went up 9 per cent immediately after the 
26 
Act was passed. In order to keep up with this rising cost-
of-living the WSB abandoned the 10 per cent Freeze, and 
2'7 
established a 12 per cent order. 
Thus the control of inflation was no better 
through the summer of 1951, than it had been in the previous 
peak price year of 1950. Controls, in fact, were not 
stronger, as Labor had desired and campaigned to obtain, 
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but were greatly weakened by the Capehart Amenament. 
The ULPC Demise. 
After the Defense Production Act had been passed 
by Congress and the President had signed it, there was 
actually nothing more which the ULPC could do for Organized 
Labor in the Defense Program. All the aims. with the ex-
ception of one which had been established by the December 
Meeting of Labor had been accomplished. Nothing further . 
could be done about this until the issue came before Congress 
1 
in 1952. 
The ULPC had proved itself to be an invaluable 
aid to Labor during the time it was in existence. It had 
obtained the new WSB; it had assured that Manpower would 
be free; it had gained the flexible wage policy for Labor, 
and finally in the Summer of 1951 it was responsible for 
having the 10 per cent wage freeze lifted. Of course, it 
had also managed to obtain representation for Labor on the 
Defense Agencies. 
When the .AFL announced in Augnst of 1951 that 
they were withdrawing from the ULPO because the work of 
that Committee had been accomplished, they were essential1y 
correct. They were following the original agreement that 
when any member felt that the ULPC's job was done, the 
member had a right to withdraw. The agreement had been 
28 
that the Committee would be a temporary body. 
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Other reasons were given for the AFL withdrawal in 
addition to the one made officially by William Green. These 
reasons no doubt did serve to hasten the AFL withdrawal, 
but they were not the major cause. First the reason given 
that the AFL withdrew because the CIO had begun to form 
state UL:PC's without first obtaining the consent of the AJ!'L 
did nothing to eement good relatione between the two, but 
still it was not great enough t o cause the AFL to withdraw. 
This charge by the AFL was made in April, while the Committee 
was still functioning. However, no attempt was made at 
29 
that time to withdraw. 
Another charge made was that the CIO was dominating 
the program. However, the AFL had been given the top Labor 
30 
:Post in Defense, when Harrison was named to assist Wilson. 
Although the CIO originated the idea of the Committee, there 
was no basic favoritism given either organization during 
its exi stence. 
However, some of the AFL members like Hutcheson, 
President of the Carpenter's Union , were protesting the 
close alliance with the CIO and the Democratic Party, so 
that the AFL was receiving pressure from within to end the 
31 
relationship. This was then another pressure which served 
to hasten the withdrawal, but it, too. came long before the 
actual move. 
The final reason,other than the one officially 
given by Green, was that the CIO had violated i ts agreement 
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a t the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
elect ion in Paris, when their delegates suppor ted the 
Brit ish Socialist Tewson rather than the Italian,Passa dore, 
who was favored for the pres idency of the organization by 
the !FL. Of course, good relation s were not cemented by 
32 
the victory of Tewson . 
The repor t of the AFL delegates after returning 
home f r om the conference and elect ion in Europe no doubt 
served to strengthen the AFL's determination to withdraw 
f rom the ULPC as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the major 
r eason for the AFL withdrawal was that they believed that 
the work wa s done. 
The AF~had clear ly stated their intention of 
withdrawing at the December confer ence . In fact they made 
an agreement which the CIO a ccepted allowing them t o with-
33 
draw when the work of the Committee was accomplished. Thus 
when Green issued the reason for the AFL move, it should 
not have been a surprise to the CIO. 
The AFL still hoped that Organic Unit.y would be 
achieved. They did not feel that continued association 
with the CIO was bringing them any closer to this end. If 
the ULPC should continue, the CIO could always claim that 
their policy of Unity was working well, and that there was 
n o need to change it. 
The AFL was not ready in 1951 to a ccept Functional 
Unity on a permanent basis. The policy of continuing its 
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association with the ULPC would not further the AFL idea 
of Organic Unity. There had been too many years of dispute 
between the two Organizations in order to settle their dif-
ferences with one attempt at unit.y. 
The AFL had made their condition at the time of 
the formation of the Committee. The ULPC had gained the 
AFL the representation on the Defense agencies they desired. 
Further unity with the CIO on this issue could not accomplish 
more gains for the .AFL. In fact, continued Unity along 
these lines might even, as William Green said, "prevent any 
34 
hope of Organic Unit,r." The AFL would not sacrifice their 
hope for this form of unity in 1951. 
The AFL withdrew from the united Labor Policy 
Committee. The organization had gained the ends its leaders 
had planned to obtain when they joined with the Committee. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The United Labor Policy Committee did not establish 
permanent uni t;y between the Labor organizations of the. 
United States. The Committee had, however, been originally 
set up only to solve certain issues for the Labor interests · 1' 
of the nation. By Augnst of 1951 those issues had been 
solved. Thus the Committee was dissolved by the AFL with-
drawal in that same month. 
The ULPC was the first unification between the 
OIO and the AFL in over fifteen years. However, it was 
set up as a temporary Committee to solve the problems of 
Labor Representation, Wage Stabilization and Free Jlanpower 
under the new program for Defense which President Truman 
had set up under the Defense Production Act of 1950. 
The new act had given the President the power to 
create an Office of Defense Mobilization. When he did this 
in the late fall of 1950 he gave the position as head of 
the Agency to Charles E. Wilson, former head of the General 
Electric Company. 
Wilson, however, from Labor's point of view, did 
not give the Labor interests adequate representation in the 
new Defense Program. He also let it be known in December,l950 
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that he planned a Labor draft. This latter announcement 
was the one which finally forced the Labor Organizations to 
unite. 
Although the Manpower issue had been the final 
issue to make Labor realize the need for unification, the 
unification itself was also to solve the representation, 
wage and price problems. Thus the four organizat~ons par-
ticipating in the Committee agreed to form a temporary 
Committee in order to solve these issues which were so im-
portant to their intere~ts. 
During the winter and spring of 1951 the ULPO 
worked on the issues of representation, wages, prices and 
manpower. Aft-er their February Walkout from the Defense 
Agencies and two months of bargaining for their return, 
they finally obtained many of the demands which they had 
made to the President and the Defense Administration. 
They received a new Wage Stabilization Board with 
_greater Labor representation; a new Manpow~r Agency; a 
guarantee of free labor, and a Defense Production Act which 
would go into effect in July, 1951. This was the last de-
mand which unified Labor made to the President. All but 
the issue of the Defense Production Act was settled to the 
satisfaction of the Labor representatives. 
~e ULPO and the President failed to obtain the 
Defense Production Act for which they had campaigned through-
out the spring of 195~. The failure was due primarily to 
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the President's inabilit}r to keep his own Political party 
in line. Two groups in Congress, one which wae completely 
Democratic, that of the Southern Dixiecrats, a.nd the other, 
the Pa.rm Eloo which of course was ~omposed partially of 
the Southerners voted completely against the President's 
Bill. 
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the part of the Laboring groups of the nation. There still 
remain, . nevertheless, two major barriers to a permanent pro-
gram of unity between these two organizations. 
The first and greatest of these bars to possible 
unity is that of the jurisdictional disputes. The CIO and 
the AFL still remain jealous of each other's power among 
the laboring men of the country. However, still more im-
portant in the jurisdictional disputes are the disputes 
whioh occur within:..·. the unions of the Organizations. The 
AFL and CIO especiall y have trouble in this modern age of 
assemby line production in determining the jurisdiction 
of its own unions, without adding the problem of who would 
contr ol if the CIO and AFL did finally unite. 
The second bar to permanent unity which is o-f 
major importance is that of the Functional versus Organic 
Unity conflict which has been the problem between the two 
for the past ten years. Each organization favors its own 
concept mainly because their own concept is the one which 
wou.l.d prove most :favorable to their individual advantage. 
The ULPC was formed along functional lines only 
because of the need for quick action on the problem of the 
Defense Program. Even then the AFL· made the condition that 
the Committee would only be temporary. This organization's I 
leaders evidently felt that a continued unit.y along function-
al lines would destroy any hope for organic unity. Thus 
I 
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when they felt the work of the Committee was accomplished, 
they withdrew their support. 
However, the formation of the ULPC does indicate 
that whenever a future situation arises which is serious 
enough to warrant unified Labor Action, that action will 
be forthcoming. The ULPO bas set a precedent for their 
future unity whioh will make it easier to obtain the next 
time there is need of it. 
Organized Labor seems to be coming to the realiza-
tion that, if it is going to be strong enough politically 
to oombat other interest groups in the nation, it will have 
to be by a unification of the Labor forces. The formation 
of the ULPC was an indication of this coming realization. 
However, there are still the problems of jurisdiction and 
the form of unity to be solved before that final unity will 
be achieved. 
I' 
'I c=-=~== 
I 
I 
I 
-------'= 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
~==--~' ============= 
- - ~4 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Daugherty, Carroll R., Labor Problems in American 
Industry. Boston: Houghton,M{f?.Lin co., 1948. 
Dulles, Foster R., Labor in America. 
New York: Crowell ~mpany, 1949. 
Harris, Herbert, Labor's Civil War. 
New York: Alfred Knopf Company, 1940. 
Harris, Seymour, Price and Related Controls in the 
United States. llfew York: MoGraw-Hi11 ,oOFCo. ,1945. 
Hart, Albert G., Defense without Inflation. The Twentieth 
Century Fund on Economic Stabilization. 
New York, 1951. 
Johnson, Julia E., Poet War Stabilization. (The Reference 
Shelf; Vol. ~No;-7 • 
New York: H.w. Wilson Company, 1945. 
, Wage Stabilization and Inflation. 
-------n{T~· h~e~R~e,f~erenoe Shelf; Vol. 16;-rQ. 4). 
New York: H.w. Wilson Company, 1943. 
Key, Vladimer o., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. 
New York: Thomas Crowell Co., ~2. 
Levenstein, Aaron, Labor Today and Tomorrow. 
New York: Alfred A. Knop~l945. 
Marx, Herbert, American Labor Unions. (The Reference Shelf; Vol. 21; No. 5). 
New York: H.w. Wilson Company, 1950. 
Miller , Glenn w., American Labor and the Government. 
New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., me. 
Mosher, William E., Kingsley, J. Donald, and Stahl, o. Glenn, 
Publio Personnel Administration. 3rd edition. 
New York: Harper Brothers, 1956. 
Nicholls, William H., and Vieg, John A., War time Government 
in Operation. 
~ladel;phia: The Blakiatone Company, 1946. 
! 
:Peterson, Florence, American Labor Unions. 
New York: Harper Brothers, 1945. 
~horp, Willard, American Issues, Vol. II. 
Trenton: Princeton University Press, 1941. 
DOCUMENTS 
Fair Labor Standards Act. Public Law 718; 75th Congress. 
---- Chapter 676- 3~Seeaion. Senate 3475. 1938. 
N~tional Management Labor Relatione Act. Public Law 101. 
BOth Congress. Chapter 120- !if Session. H.R. 3020. 
1947. 
Defense Production Act. Public Law 96. 82nd Congress. 
3rd Sesaion.-:8enate 1397. 1961. 
PAMPHLETS 
UE Ve. Comfa.ny Unionism. UE Pub. No. 148. United Electrical 
-- -- Rad o, and Machin e Workers of America., New York , 
1950. 
u.s. Department of Labor, A Short His.tory of the American 
Labor Movement. House Document No.~6~8lst 
Congress, 2nd Session. Government Printing Office, 
washington, n.o., 1961. 
PERIODICALS 
American Federationist, "Let Labor Take Part." American 
Federation of Labor, Washington, D.O., January,1951. 
American Jederationist, "Labor's J?osition," January, 1951. 
American Federationist, "Should Labor Be Ignored?" January, 
"'!951. 
American Federationist, "Let Labor Take Part, February,l951. 
American Federationist, "The Plain People Get a Raw Deal," 
March, 1951. 
American Federationist, "Labor Participation in ODM," 
Mar c1i, 1951 • 
. !merican Federationist, "Labor Joins a Top Level Board," 
A:Prii, 1951. 
96 
l 
I; 
li 
-===iF--=11 =--~--==-=-=--=-=~·~-=---=---==--==---=-=-=---==-=--=-=-=--===-=-c __ -=--·-·==·---~-=-=---=c===ll=~ -- -
------ i -- .America:n_ Federationist, "United Labor Asks Fair Play," 
I 
I 
April, 1951. 
American Federationist, "Making Progress," May, 1951. 
American Federationist, "Purpose in Withdrawal," May, 1951. 
American Federationist, "Report of AFL Convention," 
September, 1951. 
Business Week, "New Problem Manpower," McGraw-Hill Book 
~ompany, New York, July 15, 1950. 
Business Week, "Wages, Can They Be Stabilized?" November 4, 
19~ 
Business Week, "WSB Lined up to Mark Time," December 2,1950. 
Business Week, "United Front on Mobilization," December 30, 
19mr.-
Business Week, "Rising Cost of Living," January 28, 1951. 
Business Week, "Wage Board Calls for Flexible Wage Controls," 
February 3• 1951. 
Business Week, "!Tever, Never Again," February 10, 1951. 
Business Week, "Who'll Mobilize ll[anpower?" February 10, 1951. 
Business !!!!• ~anpower Policy, Draft'Em," February 17,1951. 
Business Week, "On Manpower- No Rules,"" February 1'7, 1951. 
Business Week, "Pay Stabilizers in Trouble," February 1'7, 
19or.-
Business Week, ""Mobilization Fight: Congress vs . Truman," 
MB.y-5; 1951. 
Business Week, "Stretching the Labor SUpply," July 14, 1951. 
Business~. "Labor Wants Coats Plus," August 4, 1951. 
Business Week , "AFL-CIO Split Overdramatized," August 25, 
19'!5l7"" 
1: 
II 
_I_!-
Business Week, "Mapping Policy in Disputes," October 16, 
19m::-
--=-=-=o---=--=-==--"·c --- --
Commonweal, "The Break between AFL and CIO," Commonweal Co. , 
New York, September 28, 1951. 
Fortune, "The Teolmioians Move in." 
Illinois, February, 1951. 
Time, Inc., Chicago , 
Nation, "The Manpower Balance Sheet." 
New York, February 10, 1951. 
Nation Associates, Ina ll 
Nation, "The Squeeze on Labor," February 24, 1951. 
Nation, "The Shape of Things, " April 28, 1951. 
New Republic, "Manpower for Defense." Editorial Publica-
--- tiona, Ina., washington, D.c., February 5, 1951. 
New Republic, "Labor's War at Home, " February 26, 1951. 
New Republic, "President's Compromise," May 7, 1951. 
New Republic, "Guaranteed: Profits and Deprivations," 
--- August 13, 1951. 
Newsweek, "Truman Controls." Newsweek, New York, September 
ll, 1950. 
Newsweek, "Labor Wants in or Else," March 15, 1951. 
Newsweek, "Labor Comes Around," April 16, 1951. 
Newsweek, "Wanted Tighter Controls," May 7, 1951. 
Newsweek, "After June 30, What?" June 18, 1951. 
Newsweek, "Needling the President," July 2, 1951 . 
I Newsweek, "Prices Are Rising, So Are Tempers," August 13,1951. 
Survey, "On the Labor Management Front." Survey Associates, 
Inc. , East Stroudsburg, Pa., July, 1951. 
Time, "Labor's Prioe." Time, Inc., Ohioago,Illinois, 
March 5, 1951. 
~. "The Congress: Bull Rings in Their Noses," July 9,1951. 
--- -- ---=-=="'"""' 
u.s. News and World Retort, "Men in De~ense Posts." 
--r.s:--News, Waenngton, D.c., December 1, 1950. 
u.s. News , "No Place for Business to Sag," December 1, 1951. 
u.s. ~. "How to Get Enough Workers," December 15, 1951. 
u.s. News, "Job Freeze Shapes up," January 26, 1951. 
u.s. News, "Policy Unit Split is Appraised," September 7, 
1951. 
u.s. Department of La.bor: Monthly Labor Review. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.c. 
Montbly Labor Review, "Wage Stabilization," September, 1950. 
Monthly Labor Review, "Defense Production Act, 1950," 
October, 1950. 
Monthly Labor Review, "Twelfth Convention of CIO," January, 
1950. 
Monthly Labor Review, "Section III," July, 1950. 
Monthly Labor Review, "End of ULPO," September, 1951. 
]!ontbly Labor Review, "Review of Labor in 1951, the ULPO," 
February, 1950. 
NEWSPAPERS · 
OIO News, ''Withdrawal of ULPO," Congress of Industrial 
----organization, Washington, D.C., March 5, 1951. 
OIO News, "HST to Name New WSB Despite Big Biz.," April 23, 
--,951. 
0!0 News, "United Labor Action Groups Being Formed in Many 
--- ---xreas," April 23, 1951. 
0!0 News, "ULPO Reasons for Labor Action," May 7, 1951. 
I 
I 
I' 
1
1
1 98 
I 
CIO News, "CIO Opens Fight for Stronger Defense Production 
- ---rat," May 14, 1951. 
CIO News, "New Wage Board May Lift 10% Ceiling," May 14,1951. 
~ !!!!• "Ending Controls Would Spell Disaster," May 25,195l l 
OIO News "Congress Is Letting People Down," July 16,1951. __ , 
CIO !.!!!!• "What Now, Congress?" Augnat 6, 1951. 
CIO News, "Why .AFL Withdrew," Augu.st 20, 1951. 
New York Timee, "The Labor Walkout." Times Ina., New York, 
- ~unday, Maroh 4, 1951. 
!!!! York Times Ma!zine, "Making the Most of Manpower," 
---rla.y 13, 19 • 
99 
ABSTRACT 
The United Labor Policy Oo~ttee was final1y 
broken up in August, 1951, because the ends for which it 
had been formed to achieve had been aohieved. There was 
no longer any neoessi ty for its members to continue their 
participation on this Ocmmittee. 
The ULPC was originally created by the CIO, 
AFL, International Association of Machinists, and the 
Railroad Brotherhoods in order to obtain representation 
on the newly formed defense agencies. The objectives of 
the Committee were to make sure that the National Government• ' 
program for defense, especially pertaining to Manpower, 
Wages, and Prices would be favorable to the interests of 
. organized Labor during the Korean Crisis. 
The committee was originally formed on the condi-
tion that its activity would be temporary. When the issues 
for whioh it had been formed to solve were solved, then any 
member had the right to discontinue its membership. 
The ULPC proved to be an effective organ for 
the carrying out of Labor's desires in the Defense Program. 
In the first place, the Labor Walkout of February and 
March of 1961 proved especially rewarding to Organized 
Labor. By the unified action on the part of the Labor 
Organizations, they were able to obtain most of the condi-
tions they had made at the December Conference. 
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In the first plaoe, a new WSB was set up to 
handle the wage policies of the Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion. The WSB was also given the power to settle any major 
Labor disputes which occurred over Union Contract diffi-
culties. 
The President, after hearing Labor's proposals 
for a better Defense Administrative Agency,agreed to set 
up a new National Advisory Board which was to be oo.mposed 
of Labor, Farm, Management, and Public Members. This 
Board was to investigate all Defense Measures and report 
to the President at least once a month. 
The ULPC also achieved representation for the 
Labor Organizations whioh it represented on all the major 
Defense Agencies. Thus this policy was won by the action 
of United Labor as was the new WSB. 
The President also guaranteed Labor that there 
would be no draft of Manpower as proposed by Charles E. 
Wilson. Labor also was granted another of its demands 
when the President split the authority to direct Manpower 
controls between the Office of Defense Mobilization and 
the Department of Labor. In this case, Labor had wanted 
the full control placed in the Department of Labor, but 
the President had at least granted half their program on 
manpower, and also had weakened Wilson's power over the 
issue considerably by dividing the authority and responsi -
bility for the manpower program. 
=--==' = == -=== 
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This division of authority weakened the action 
which could be taken, for now all action had to be taken 
by Co~ttee decision, thus creating delays which do not 
occur when one person has full control over a program. 
However, the program was much mo~e favorable to Organized 
Labor than it had been under the old system with one person 
in control. With Committee action Labor was given the 
opportunity to bargain whieh it did not have in the old 
set up. 
The one failure which the ULPC met was in the 
Congressional refusal to support President Truman's pro-
posals for a new Defense Production Act. However, this 
was not so much the failure of Labor, as it was the Presi-
dent's failure in not being able to control his party. 
The ULPC breakup came in Augu.st, 1951, after 
the AFL decided that the work of the Committee was finished. 
With the failure of the Defense Production Act, there was 
no more to be achieved by the ULPC in 1951. As it was, the 
AFL withdrew, because the Policy Committee had been formed 
on a temporary basis for the achievement of certain ends; 
those ends had been achieved. 
~e AFL was not yet willing to sacrifice their 
hope for Organic Unity. They felt that a continuation of 
their association with the ULPC would not help attain that 
I 
However, despite the fact that the AFL was not 
ready for Unity on any terms but their own, the unity which 
had been achieved by the ULPO was an indication that the 
great Labor Organizations were being foroed to realize the 
need for unity if they were to be able to provide an effect-
ive political pressure group, and thus save their own in-
terests in the national program for defense. 
The ULPC was not the final answer to Labor unity. 
However, the Committee was only set up as a. temporary organ-
ization to solve certain issues. Those issues were solved. 
Before permanent unity can be obtained the issues of juris-
diction and the forms of unity will have to be settled. 
When this is accomplished, the labor organizations will 
unite. The ULPC was an indication that this unification 
may not be too far distant. At least the next time that 
unity is needed, the ULPC will have paved the way for the 
second attempt. 
103 
